本科毕业论文中英文翻译Wirele Communications无线通信_本科毕业论文外文翻译
本科毕业论文中英文翻译Wirele Communications无线通信由刀豆文库小编整理，希望给你工作、学习、生活带来方便，猜你可能喜欢“本科毕业论文外文翻译”。
Wirele Communications
by
Joshua S.Gans, Stephen P.King and Julian Wright
1.Introduction
In 1895, Guglielmo Marconi opened the way for modern wirele communications by transmitting the three-dot Morse code for the letter „S‟ over a distance of three kilometers using electromagnetic waves.From this beginning, wirele communications has developed into a key element of modern society.From satellite transmiion, radio and television broadcasting to the now ubiquitous mobile telephone, wirele communications has revolutionized the way societies function.This chapter surveys the economics literature on wirele communications.Wirele communications and the economic goods and services that utilise it have some special characteristics that have motivated specialised studies.First, wirele communications relies on a scarce resource – namely, radio spectrum – the property rights for which were traditionally vested with the state.In order to foster the development of wirele communications(including telephony and broadcasting)those aets were privatised.Second, use of spectrum for wirele communications required the development of key complementary technologies;especially those that allowed higher frequencies to be utilised more efficiently.Finally, because of its special nature, the efficient use of spectrum required the coordinated development of standards.Those standards in turn played a critical role in the diffusion of technologies that relied on spectrum use.In large part our chapter focuses on wirele telephony rather than broadcasting and other uses of spectrum(e.g., telemetry and biomedical services).Specifically, the economics literature on that industry has focused on factors driving the diffusion of wirele telecommunication technologies and on the nature of network pricing regulation and competition in the industry.By focusing on the economic literature, this chapter complements other surveys in this Handbook.Hausman(2002)focuses on technological and policy developments in mobile telephony rather than economic research per se.Cramton(2002)provides a survey of the theory and practice of spectrum auctions used for privatisation.Armstrong(2002a)and Noam(2002)consider general iues regarding network interconnection and acce pricing while Woroch(2002)investigates the potential for wirele technologies as a substitute for local fixed line telephony.Finally, Liebowitz and Margolis(2002)provide a general survey of the economics literature on network effects.In contrast, we focus here solely on the economic literature on the mobile telephony industry.The outline for this chapter is as follows.The next section provides background information regarding the adoption of wirele communication technologies.Section 3 then considers the economic iues aociated with mobile telephony including spectrum allocation and standards.Section 4 surveys recent economic studies of the diffusion of mobile telephony.Finally, section 5 reviews iues of regulation and competition;in particular, the need for and principles behind acce pricing for mobile phone networks.2.Background
* Marconi‟s pioneering work quickly led to variety of commercial and government(particularly military)developments and innovations.In the early 1900s, voice and then music was transmitted and modern radio was born.By 1920, commercial radio had been established with Detroit station WWJ and KDKA in Pittsburgh.Wirele telegraphy was
first used by the British military in South Africa in 1900 during the Anglo-Boer war.The British navy used equipment supplied by Marconi to communicate between ships in Delagoa Bay.Shipping was a major early client for wirele telegraphy and wirele was standard for shipping by the time the Titanic iued its radio distre calls in 1912.Early on, it was quickly recognized that international coordination was required for wirele communication to be effective.This coordination involved two features.First, the potential for interference in radio transmiions meant that at least local coordination was needed to avoid the transmiion of conflicting signals.Secondly, with spectrum to be used for international communications and areas such as maritime safety and navigation, coordination was neceary between countries to guarantee consistency in approach to these services.This drove government intervention to ensure the coordinated allocation of radio spectrum.2.1 Spectrum Allocation
Radio transmiion involves the use of part of the electromagnetic spectrum.Electromagnetic energy is transmitted in different frequencies and the properties of the energy depend on the frequency.For example, visible light has a frequency between 4×10and 7.5×10Hz.Ultra violet radiation, X-rays and gamma rays have higher frequencies(or equivalently a shorter wave length)while infrared radiation, microwaves and radio waves have lower frequencies(longer wavelengths).The radio frequency spectrum involves electromagnetic radiation with frequencies between 3000 Hz and 300 GHz.Even within the radio spectrum, different frequencies have different properties.As Cave(2001)notes, the higher the frequency, the shorter the distance the signal will travel, but the greater the capacity of the signal to carry data.The tasks of internationally coordinating the use of radio spectrum, managing interference and setting global standards are undertaken by the International Telecommunication Union(ITU).The ITU was created by the International Telecommunications Convention in 1947 but has predeceors dating back to approximately 1865.It is a specialist agency of the United Nations with over 180 members.The Radiocommunication Sector of the ITU coordinates global spectrum use through the Radio Regulations.These regulations were first put in place at the 1906 Berlin International Radiotelegraph Conference.Allocation of the radio spectrum occurs along three dimensions – the frequency, the geographic location and the priority of the user with regards to interference.The radio spectrum is broken into eight frequency bands, ranging from Very Low Frequency(3 to 30 kHz)up to Extremely High Frequency(30 to 300 GHz).Geographically, the world is also divided into three regions.The ITU then allocates certain frequencies for specific uses on either a worldwide or a regional basis.Individual countries may then further allocate frequencies within
1the ITU international allocation.For example, in the United States, the Federal Communications Commiion‟s(FCC‟s)table of frequency allocations is derived from both the international table of allocations and U.S.allocations.Users are broken in to primary and secondary services, with primary users protected from interference from secondary users but not vice versa.As an example, in 2003, the band below 9 kHz was not allocated in the international or the U.S.table.9 to 14 kHz was allocated to radio navigation in both tables and all international regions while 14 to 70 kHz is allocated with both maritime communications and fixed wirele communications as primary users.There is also an international time signal at 20kHz.But the U.S.table also adds an additional time frequency at 60 kHz.International regional distinctions begin to appear in the 70 to 90 kHz range with differences in use and priority between radio navigation, fixed, radiolocation and maritime mobile uses.These allocations continue right up to 300GHz, with frequencies above 300 GHz not allocated in the United States and those above 275 GHz not allocated in the international table.The ITU deals with interference by requiring member countries to follow notification and registration procedures whenever they plan to aign frequency to a particular use, such as a radio station or a new satellite.2.2 The range of wirele services
Radio spectrum is used for a wide range of services.These can be broken into the following broad claes:
• Broadcasting services: including short wave, AM and FM radio as well as terrestrial television;
• Mobile communications of voice and data: including maritime and aeronautical mobile for communications between ships, airplanes and land;land mobile for communications between a fixed base station and moving sites such as a taxi fleet and paging services, and mobile communications either between mobile users and a fixed network or between mobile users, such as mobile telephone services;
• Fixed Services: either point to point or point to multipoint services;
• Satellite: used for broadcasting, telecommunications and internet, particularly over long distances;
• Amateur radio;
• Other Uses: including military, radio astronomy, meteorological and scientific uses.The amount of spectrum allocated to these different uses differs by country and frequency band.For example, in the U.K., 40% of the 88MHz to 1GHz band of frequencies are used for TV broadcasting, 22% for defense, 10% for GSM mobile and 1% for maritime communications.In contrast, none of the 1GHz to 3 GHz frequency range is used for television, 19% is allocated to
5GSM and third-generation mobile phones, 17% to defense and 23% for aeronautical radar.The number of different devices using wirele communications is rising rapidly.Sensors and embedded wirele controllers are increasingly used in a variety of appliances and applications.Personal digital aistants(PDAs)and mobile computers are regularly connected to e-mail and internet services through wirele communications, and wirele local area networks for computers are becoming common in public areas like airport lounges.However, by far the most important and dramatic change in the use of wirele communications in the past twenty years has been the rise of the mobile telephone.2.3 The rise and rise of mobile telephony
The history of mobile telephones can be broken into four periods.The first(pre-cellular)period involved mobile telephones that exclusively used a frequency band in a particular area.These telephones had severe problems with congestion and call completion.If one customer was using a particular frequency in a geographic area, no other customer could make a call on that same frequency.Further, the number of frequencies allocated by the FCC in the U.S.to mobile telephone services was small, limiting the number of simultaneous calls.Similar systems, known as A-Netz and B-Netz were developed in Germany.The introduction of cellular technology greatly expanded the efficiency of frequency use of mobile phones.Rather than exclusively allocating a band of frequency to one telephone call in a large geographic area, a cell telephone breaks down a geographic area into small areas or cells.Different users in different(non-adjacent)cells are able to use the same frequency for a call without interference.First generation cellular mobile telephones developed around the world using different, incompatible analogue technologies.For example, in the 1980s in the U.S.there was the Advanced Mobile Phone System(AMPS), the U.K.had the Total Acce Communications System(TACS), Germany developed C-Netz, while Scandinavia developed the Nordic Mobile Telephone(NMT)system.The result was a wide range of largely incompatible systems, particularly in Europe, although the single AMPS system was used throughout the U.S.Second generation(2G)mobile telephones used digital technology.The adoption of second generation technology differed substantially between the United States and Europe and reverses the earlier analogue mobile experience.In Europe, a common standard was adopted, partly due to government intervention.Groupe Speciale Mobile(GSM)was first developed in the 1980s and was the first 2G system.But it was only in 1990 that GSM was standardized(with the new name of Global System for Mobile communication)under the auspices of the European Technical Standards Institute.The standardized GSM could allow full international roaming, automatic location services, common encryption and relatively high quality audio.GSM is now the most widely used 2G system worldwide, in more than 130 countries, using the 900 MHz frequency range.In contrast, a variety of incompatible 2G standards developed in the United States.These include TDMA, a close relative of GSM, and CDMA, referring to Time and Code Division Multiple Acce respectively.These technologies differ in how they break down calls to allow for more efficient use of spectrum within a single cell.While there is some argument as to the „better‟ system, the failure of the U.S.to adopt a common 2G standard, with the aociated benefits interms of roaming and switching of handsets, meant the first generation AMPS system remained the most popular mobile technology in the U.S.throughout the 1990s.The final stage in the development of mobile telephones is the move to third generation(3G)technology.These systems will allow for significantly increased speeds of transmiion and are particularly useful for data services.For example, 3G phones can more efficiently be used for e-mail services, and downloading content(such as music and videos)from the internet.They can also allow more rapid transmiion of images, for example from camera phones.An attempt to establish an international standard for 3G mobile is being moderated through the ITU, under the auspices of its IMT-2000 program.IMT-2000 determined that 3G technology should be based on CDMA systems but there are(at least two)alternative competing systems and IMT-2000 did not choose a single system but rather a suite of approaches.At the ITU‟s World Radiocommunication Conference in 2000, frequencies for IMT-2000 systems were allocated on a worldwide basis.By 2002, the only 3G system in operation was in Japan, although numerous companies have plans to roll out 3G systems in the next few years.The growth in use of mobile telephones has been spectacular.From almost a zero base in the early 1980s, mobile penetration worldwide in 2002 is estimated at 15.57 mobile phones per 100 people worldwide.Of course, the level of penetration differs greatly between countries.In the United States, there were 44.2 mobile telephones per 100 inhabitants, with penetration rates of 60.53 in France, 68.29 in Germany, 77.84 in Finland and 78.28 in the United Kingdom.Thus, in general mobile penetration is lower in the U.S.than in the wealthier European countries.Outside Europe and the U.S., the penetration rate in Australia is 57.75, 62.13 in New Zealand, and 58.76 in Japan.Unsurprisingly, penetration rates depend on the level of economic development, so that India had only 0.63 mobile telephones per 100 inhabitants in 2002, with 1.60 for Kenya, 11.17 for China, and 29.95 for Malaysia.The number of mobile phones now exceeds the number of fixed-wire telephone lines in a variety of countries including Germany，France, the United Kingdom, Greece, Italy and Belgium.However, the reverse holds, with fixed-lines outnumbering mobiles in the United States, Canada, and Argentina.Penetration rates were close to equal in Japan in 2001, but in all countries, mobile penetration is rising much faster than fixed lines.The price for mobile phone services are difficult to compare between countries.In part this reflects exchange rate variations, but more importantly pricing packages and the form of pricing differs significantly between countries.Most obviously, different countries have different charging mechanisms, with „calling party pays‟ dominating outside the United States.But in the United States and Canada „receiving party pays‟ pricing often applies for calls to mobile telephones.Different packages and bundling of equipment and call charges also make comparisons difficult.A major innovation in mobile telephone pricing in the late 1990s was the use of pre-paid cards.This system, where customers pay in advance for mobile calls rather than being billed at a later date, has proved popular in many countries.For example, in Sweden, pre-paid cards gained 25% of the mobile market within two years of their introduction(OECD, 2000, p.11).Despite the changing patterns of pricing, the OECD estimates that there was a 25% fall in the cost of a representative „bundle‟ of mobile services over its member countries between 1992 and 1998(OECD, 2000, p.22).83.Economic Iues in Wirele Communications
3.1 Spectrum as a scarce resource Radio spectrum is a natural resource, but one with rather unusual properties.As noted above, it is non-homogeneous, with different parts of the spectrum being best used for different purposes.It is finite in the sense that only part of the electromagnetic spectrum is suitable for wirele communications, although both the available frequencies and the carrying capacity of any transmiion system depend on technology.The radio spectrum is non-depletable;using spectrum today does not reduce the amount available for use in the future.But it is non-storable.Under ITU guidance, spectrum has been allocated to specific uses and then aigned to particular users given the relevant use.Traditionally, user aignment was by government fiat.Not infrequently, the user was government owned.Privatizations in the 1980s and 1990s, and the succe of(at least limited)mobile telephone competition in some countries, resulted in a more arms-length proce of spectrum allocation developing in the 1990s.Users of radio spectrum, and particularly users of 2G and 3G mobile telephone spectrum, have generally been chosen by one of two broad approaches since the early 1990s – a „beauty contest‟ or an auction.A „beauty contest‟ involves potential users submitting busine plans to the government(or its appointed committee).The winners are then chosen from those firms submitting plans.There may be some payment to the government by the winners, although the potential user most willing to pay for the spectrum need not be among the winners.For example, the U.K.used a beauty contest approach to aign 2G mobile telephone licenses in the 1990s.Sweden and Spain have used beauty contests to aign 3G licenses.France used a beauty contest to aign four 3G licenses.The national telecommunications regulator required firms to submit applications by the end of January 2001.These applications were then evaluated according to preset criteria and given a mark out of 500.Criteria included employment(worth up to 25 points), service offerings(up to 50 points)and speed of deployment(up to 100 points).Winning applicants faced a relatively high license fee set by the government.As a result, there were only two applicants.These firms received their licenses in June 2001, with the remaining two licenses unallocated(Penard, 2002).The concept of using a market mechanism to aign property rights over spectrum and to deal with iues such as interference goes back to at least the 1950s when it was canvaed by Herzel(1951)and then by Coase(1959).But it was more than thirty years before spectrum auctions became common.New Zealand altered its laws to allow spectrum auctions in 1989 and in the early 1990s auctions were used to aign blocks of spectrum relating to mobile telephones, television, radio broadcasting and other smaller services to private management(Crandall, 1998).In August 1993, U.S.law was modified to allow the FCC to use auctions to aign radio spectrum licenses and by July 1996 the FCC had conducted seven auctions and aigned over 2,100 licenses(Moreton and Spiller, 1998).This included the aignment of two new 2G mobile telephone licenses in each region of the U.S.through two auctions.In 2000, the U.K.auctioned off five 3G licenses for a total payment of approximately $34b.Auctions have involved a variety of formats including „second price sealed bid‟ in New
10Zealand, modified ascending bid in the U.S.and a mixed ascending bid and Dutch auction format in the U.K.11 Bidders may have to satisfy certain criteria, such as service guarantees and participation deposits, before they can participate in the auctions.Limits may also be placed on the number of licenses a single firm can win in a particular geographic area, so that the auction does not create a monopoly supplier.From an economic perspective, using an auction to aign spectrum helps ensure that the spectrum goes to the highest value user.While auctions have been used to aign spectrum to different users, they still involve a prior centralized allocation of bands of spectrum to particular uses.Economically, this can lead to an inefficient use of spectrum.A user of a particular frequency band(e.g.for 3G services)might have a much higher willingne-to-pay for neighboring spectrum than the current user of that neighboring spectrum(e.g.a broadcaster or the military).But the prior allocation of frequency bands means that these parties are unable to benefit from mutually advantageous trade.It would violate the existing license conditions to move spectrum allocated to one use into another use even if this is mutually advantageous.Building on the work of Coase(1959), Valletti(2001)proposes a system of tradable spectrum rights, using the market to both allocate spectrum to uses and simultaneously aign it to users.Interference can be dealt with through the aignment of property rights and negotiation between owners of neighboring spectrum.Valletti notes that both competition iues and iues of mandated standards would need to be addreed in a market for spectrum rights.We deal with the iue of standards later in this section while competition iues are considered in section 5 below.Noam(1997)takes the concept of tradable spectrum aignment one stage further.Technological advancements, such as the ability for a signal to be broken into numerous separate digital packets for the purposes of transmiion and then reaembled on reception, means that the concept of permanent spectrum aignment may become redundant in the near future.As technology advances, Noam argues, spot and forward markets can be used to aign use within designated bands of spectrum.The price of spectrum use would then alter to reflect congestion of use.DeVany(1998)also discues market-based spectrum policies, including the potential for a future “open, commoditized, unbundled spectrum market system.”(p.641)
Conflicts in the allocation of spectrum allocation arose in the FCC auctions in the U.S.The 1850-1910 MHz and 1930-1990MHz bands to be allocated by these auctions already had private fixed point-to-point users.The FCC ruled that existing users had a period of up to three years to negotiate alternative spectrum location and compensation with new users.If negotiations failed, the existing user could be involuntarily relocated.Cramton, Kwerel and Williams(1998)examine a variety of alternative „property rights‟ regimes for negotiated reallocation of existing spectrum and conclude that the experience of the U.S.reallocations is roughly consistent with simple bargaining theory.While economists have generally advocated the aignment of spectrum by auction, auctions are not without their critics.Binmore and Klemperer(2002)argue that a number of the arguments against auctions are misguided.But both Noam(1997)and Gruber(2001b)make the criticism that spectrum auctions automatically create a non-competitive oligopoly environment.Gruber argues that technological change has generally increased the efficiency of spectrum use and increased the viability of competition in wirele services.For example, in terms of spectral efficiency, GSM mobile telephone services are approximately four to thirty times more efficient than earlier analogue systems(Gruber, 2001b, Table 1).An auction of spectrum rights, however, is preceded by an allocation of spectrum.The government usually allocates a fixed band of spectrum to the relevant services.Further, the government usually decides on the number of licenses that it will auction within this band.So the price paid at the auction and the level of ex post competition in the relevant wirele services are determined by the amount of spectrum and the number of licenses the government initially allocates to the service.While the auction creates competition for the scarce spectrum, it does not allow the market to determine the optimal form of competition.Noam argues that flexibility of entry needs to be provided by the aignment system in order to overcome the artificial creation of a non-competitive market structure.3.2 Complementarities in spectrum use Using spectrum to produce wirele communications services can lead to synergies between services and between geographic regions.In the U.K., 3G spectrum auction, the potential synergies between 2G and 3G mobile telephone infrastructure was noted by Binmore and Klemperer:
[T]he incumbents who are already operating in the 2G telecom industry enjoy a major advantage over potential new entrants ….Not only are the incumbents‟ 2G businees complementary to 3G, but the costs of rolling out the infrastructure(radio masts and the like)neceary to operate a 3G industry are very substantially le than those of a new entrant, because they can piggyback on the 2G infrastructure.(2002, p.C80)Thus, there are synergies in terms of being able to supply new products to an existing customer base using existing brands, and economies of scope between 2G and 3G services.Geographic synergies are evident from the FCC 2G auctions.Moreton and Spiller(1998)examine the two 1995-96 mobile phone auctions in the U.S.They run a reduced-form regreion on the winning bid for each license and a number of factors designed to capture the demographics of the relevant license area, the competitive and regulatory environment, and the effects of any synergies.These were ascending bid auctions so that the winning price is approximately equal to the second-to-last bidder‟s valuation for the license.As such, the relevant synergies relate to the network of the second-to-last bidder, to capture any effect of this network on the value of that bidder.To capture the effect of geographic synergies, Moreton and Spiller aume that the expected network aociated with any bidder is the same as the actual post-auction network.They categorize geographic synergies as either „local‟ or „global‟.Local synergies consider the relationship between value of a license in one area and ownership of 2G licenses in neighboring geographic areas.Global synergies look at the total extent of the second-to-last bidder‟s national network.Moreton and Spiller find strong evidence of local synergies.“At the local level, our results indicate that groups of two or more adjacent licenses were worth more to asingle bidder than to separate bidders.”(p.711)These local synergies appear to fall rapidly as the geographic area covered by adjacent licenses increases and evidence of global synergies is weak.Local coverage by existing cellular services tended to reduce the price paid for 2G licenses in the Moreton and Spiller study.This appears to run counter to the Binmore and Klemperer argument for economies of scope between different mobile telephone services.Moreton andSpiller argue that the negative relationship may reflect a reduction in competition.Firms are reluctant to bid strongly against existing analogue mobile telephone incumbents and prefer to use their limited resources elsewhere.This argument, however, is weak.In an ascending bid auction, participants will bid up to their own valuations and if there are positive synergies between existing analogue mobile services and 2G services, this should raise the value of the license to the second-to-last bidder regardle of any other parties bids.As expected, Moreton and Spiller find that the value of a 2G license increases with market population and population growth rate and decreases with the size of the area served.These results are broadly consistent with Ausubel, et.al.(1997)and are intuitive.Population and demand are likely to be positively correlated so that for any given level of competition, increased population will tend to increase expected profits.But increased geographic region tends to raise the roll-out cost of the 2G cellular network for any population size, lowering expected profits.The Moreton and Spiller study find some evidence that those jurisdictions where regulators require tariff filing for the existing analogue mobile phone networks tend to have higher values for the 2G licenses.This suggests that tariff filing on existing services may have an anti-competitive effect leading to higher prices overall.The potential anti-competitive effects aociated with regulatory notification and publication of price information has been shown in other industries.无线通信
约书亚圣甘斯，斯蒂芬.金和朱利安赖特著
1.Introduction 概述 1895年，Guglielmo Marconi 利用电磁波把3位摩尔斯电码编码的字母S传递到3公里以外的地方，为现代无线通信指明了道路。至此，无线通信就慢慢成为了现代社会的重要组成部分。从卫星传输，广播电视，到现在无处不在的移动电话，无线通信已经使社会发生了革命性的变化。
这一章主要是概述经济文献对无线通信的研究现状。
无线通信为了支持无线通信的发展（包括电话和广播），私有化应运而生。其次，基于无线通信的频谱使用要求互补性技术的发展，尤其是及其在经济活动应用中的一些特点刺激了关于无线通信的专门研究。首先，无线通信是建立在一种稀有资源之上的，即，无线电频谱，而它往往为国家所掌控。要能使那些高频率的频谱得到更有效的利用。最后，因为其本身的特性，高效率的频谱使用又要求标准的协调发展。这些标准反过来又大大推动了基于频谱使用的技术的扩散。这一章，我们的重点是无线电话，而不是广播或其他种类的频谱使用技术（例如，遥测和生物医学服务）而且，这些文献主要关注的是，在这个产业内，推动无线通信技术扩散的因素和网络定价的规则及其竞争力。
通过关注这些经济文献，本章补充说明了整个手册中其他调查中的一些问题。Hausman主要研究的是移动电话技术和政策的发展而不是经济研究本身。Cramton侧重于，在频谱私有化过程中，频谱拍卖的一些理论与实践。Armstrong 和Noam 主要研究网络互连和接入定价的有关问题，与此同时Woroch关注的则是无线技术取代本地固定电话的可能性。而Liebowitz and Margolis则侧重于网络效应。而我们主要是侧重于研究移动电话产业的一些经济文献。
本章的结构如下：
第二部分主要是采用无线通信技术的背景信息。
第三部分讨论的是与移动电话有关的一些经济问题，包括频谱分配和标准。第四部分是最近关于移动电话普及的经济学研究。
最后，第五部分关注的是规则和竞争力的问题，尤其是，移动电话网络接入定价的需求和原则。
2.Background 背景
Marconi 开创性的工作很快就引起了一系列商业和政府部门（尤其是军事）的发展和变革。20世纪初，声音和音乐先后开始能够通过电磁波传递，而且现代收音机诞生。1920年，商用无线电站，底特律WWJ和匹兹堡KDKA建立。无限电报也于1900在盎格鲁-布尔战争中由在南非的英国军队首先使用。英国海军在迪拉果阿湾的船只上使用由Marconi提供的设备相互联系。船只是无线电报早期最重要的客户。到1912年，当铁达尼号使用无线电发出求救信号的时候，船只的无线电标准已经形成。在此之前，人们已经认识到了，要发挥无线通信的作用必须加强国际合作。合作包括两个方面。首先是无线电传输中可能的干扰，也就是说至少人们要通过协调以避免信号冲突。其次，由于频谱在诸如海上安全和导航等领域的应用牵扯到不同国家，因此必须通过国际协调来保证这些服务的畅通。这就要求政府干预来协调无线电频谱的合理分配。2.1 频谱分配
无线电传输涉及电磁频谱的使用。电磁能量通过不同的频率传输，而且能量的特点也取决于频率。例如，可见光的频率在4×10到7.5×10Hz之间。Ultra紫外射线，X—射线和伽玛射线频率较高（或波长教短），而红外辐射，微波和无线电波频率教低（波长较长）。无线电频谱中的电磁射线的频率在3000 Hz —300 GHz 之间。即使在同一无线电频谱中，不同的频率也具有不同的性能。Cave曾经说过，频率越高，信号传播的距离越短，容纳的数据越多。
国际间协调无线电频谱使用，防止干扰和制定全球标准的任务是由国际电信联盟承担的，它成立于1947年，前身可以追述到1865年左右，是联合国下属的一个特殊机构，由180多个成员国组成。其中的无线电通信部按照无线电规则协调全球的频谱使用。这些规则是在1906年的柏林国际无线电报会议上第一次设立的。无线电频谱的分配需要考虑三方面的因素——频率，地理位置和用户优先权（为了防止干扰，先到先得）。无线电频谱被分为八个频段，从最低(3 —30 kHz)到最高(30 —300 GHz)。整个世界被分为三个地区。ITU就在全球或地区性的基础上分配一定的频段。然后，不同国家在ITU分配的基础之上进一步分配本国的频段。例如，在美国，联邦通信委员会频率分配表就是基于国际和美国国内的频率分配表共同形成的。用户被分为主要和次要两个部分，主要部分的用户免受次要用户的干扰，反之不成立。例如，2003年，9 kHz以下的波段在国际上和美国都没有被分配。无论国际的还是美国的分配表，抑或者是国际上所有地区，9 — 14 kHz都被用于无线电导航，而14 — 70 kHz则用于海上通信和固定无线通信，且为主要用户。虽然国际上已经有了一个时间信号，为20kHz。但美国又增加了一个额外时间频率，60 kHz。从70 —90 kHz波段，国际上地区间的差异开始出现。在无线电导航，无线电定位和水上移动用途中用途和优先权都不相同。依此类推，频谱分配一直到300GHz，300GHz以上的频段在美国没有被分配，而国际上没有被分配的则是275 GHz。ITU为预防相互干扰要求各成员国在采用某一频率工作时，例如无线电基站或新的卫星，必须遵守公示和登记程序。
2.2 无线服务的应用范围
无线电频谱有着广泛的用途，可以分为以下几个方面：广播服务：包括短波，AM和FM电台以及地面电视 语音和数据的移动通信：包括用于船舶和飞行器上的海上和航空移动通信，陆上固定基站与类似出租车无线电和寻呼机等不定点之间的移动通信，移动用户与固网或移动用户之间的移动通信，例如移动电话。
固定服务：点对点或一点对多点服务
卫星：用于广播，电信和因特网，特别是长距离通信 业余无线电
其他用途：包括军事，射电天文，气象和科学用途
实现以上功能所使用频谱数量因为国家和波段的不同而有所不同。
例如，在英国从88MHz 到1GHz之间这一波段，其中40%用于电视广播，22%用于国防，10%用于GSM移动通信，1%用于海上通信。相反，从1GHz 到3 GHz这一波段，没有安排电视通信，19%用于GSM通信和3G移动电话，17%用于国防，23%用于航空雷达。
不同种类的无线通信设备的数量正在急剧增加。传感器和嵌入式无线控制器越来越多地用于一系列电器和应用工具上。PDA和笔记本电脑也越来越多的通过无线通信收发邮件和接入因特网，象机场贵宾休息室这样可供电脑无线上网的地方也不在希奇。尽管如此，在过去二十年中，无线通信最重要也是最剧烈的变化还是移动电话的出现。
2.3 移动电话的出现和普及
移动电话的历史可以分为四个时期。第一个（前蜂窝）时期移动电话只能在特定地区使用特定的频率。电话经常占线，通话质量也不好。如果用户在某一地区使用了某一频率，那么其他人就无法使用这一频率。而且，美国FCC分配给移动电话使用的频率数量也比较少，限制了同时通话的数量。德国也建立了类似的系统，有名的如A-Netz 和B-Netz。蜂窝技术的使用极大的提高了移动电话频率的使用效率。相对于在一个很大的区域一个电话单独使用一个频率，蜂窝技术把一个移动电话的通信分成了几个小的区域或单元。不同的用户在不同的（不相邻）的单元可以使用同一频率进行通话而不会受到干扰。第一代蜂窝移动电话在不同的国家采用了相互不兼容的模拟技术。例如，20世纪80年代，美国采用了AMPS系统，英国采用了TACS, 德国采用的是C-Netz，而斯堪的纳维亚半岛国家使用了NMT系统。这就导致了彼此间的不兼容，尤其是在欧洲，尽管整个美国使用的是统一的AMPS系统。
二代移动电话则使用了数字技术。虽然改进了早期模拟技术的一些问题，但二代技术的使用在美国和欧洲还是有很大的不同。因为政府干预，欧洲采用了统一的技术标准。第一个二代系统GSM在20世纪80年代建立。可直到90年代，在ETSI的主持下，GSM才得以标准化。标准化GSM能完成国际漫游，自动定位服务，常见的加密和传输相对高品质音频的功能。GSM是目前在全球使用最广泛的第二代系统，应用于130多个国家，使用900兆赫的频率范围。同时，在美国却出现了一系列不兼容的二代标准。包括TDMA,（GSM的近亲）和CDMA，即Time and Code Division Multiple Acce respectively.在一个单元内，如何分流电话从而有效使用频谱，这些系统采用了不同的技术。由于美国人没有采用统一的2G标准，所以哪个系统最好的争论一直存在，又加上手机漫游和升级的相关利益问题，因此，整个90年代 AMPS依然是美国通用移动技术的主流。移动电话最新的发展趋势是3G，其最大特点在于通信的高速率和数字服务。例如，3G电话收发电子邮件将会更加快捷，而且能从网上下载音乐和视频等内容。类似拍照手机等设备拍摄的图片也会传输的更快。
在 IMT-2000计划下，ITU正试图协调建立一个统一的国际3G标准。IMT-2000计划决定3G技术本应采用CDMA系统，可CDMA却有至少两个以上的竞争对手，因此最后折中，采用了一套办法，而不是单独的一个系统。在ITU2000年全球无线通信大会上，世界范围内IMT-2000系统使用的频率确定下来。尽管有很多公司都宣布了在接下来几年进军3G的计划，但只有日本在2002年开始了3G营运。
移动电话数量一直保持很好的增长势头。80年代几乎没有人知道移动电话是什么，可到了2002年，据估计，全世界平均每一百人就拥有15.57部移动电话。当然，国与国之间的普及水平有很大的不同。在美国，每一百人拥有44.2部移动电话，而法国是60.53部，德国68.29，芬兰77.84，英国78.28。因此，美国的电话拥有率是低于欧洲的一些富裕国家的。在欧洲和美国之外，澳大利亚的拥有率是57.75%，新西兰是62.13%，日本是58.76%。
毫无疑问，普及率与经济发展水平密切相关，所以意大利2002每一百人只拥有0.63部移动电话，肯尼亚为1.60部，中国11.17，马来西亚29.95。在一些国家移动电话的数量甚至超过了固定电话，例如，德国，法国，英国，希腊，意大利和比利时。但在美国，加拿大和阿根廷固定电话依然超过移动电话。2001年，日本两者的普及率相当。但整体来看，移动电话的普及速度远远高于固定电话。
不同国家间移动电话服务的资费难以比较。部分是因为汇率的变化，但主要是因为不同国家的价格套餐和定价形式不同。最明显的是，不同的国家有不同的收费制度，美国以外的国家主要采取打电话的一方付费。但在美国和加拿大，移动电话采用接电话乙方付费的计费方式。不同的套餐，绑定服务和通话资费也似的比较难于进行。90年代后期，最重要的变革之一就是移动电话收费采用了预付卡。
这种消费者在打电话之前就付费而不是在之后再付帐单的方式在很多国家取得了成功。例如，在瑞典，预付卡采用两年以后就占领了25%的市场分额。
尽管定价方式不同，但OECD估计，从92年到98年，平均个成员国移动电话的主要绑定服务成本下降了25%。.无线通信的经济问题
3.1 稀缺的频谱资源
无线电频谱是一种具有特殊用途的自然资源。就象上文提到的，它的性能不是均匀的，特定的部分最好用于特定用途。频谱也是有限的，因为只有部分电磁频谱能用于无线通信，尽管频率是否合适和传输系统的容量取决于技术。无线电频谱又是无限的，不是说今天使用的频段以后就不能用了，可它无法储存。在ITU的指导下，频谱按不同用途分配，然后又根据合适的用途分配给特定用户。
以前，用户分配都是靠政府法令。而且用户一般也是政府所有。80和90年代的私有化以及一些国家移动电话产业内竞争的成功促进了90年代频谱分配更加公平。从90年代早期开始，无线电频谱的用户，尤其是2G和3G移动电话频谱的用户一直都是由两种主要的方法之一选出来的，“选美比赛”或是拍卖。“选美比赛”需要用户向政府或政府任命的委员会提交商业计划。胜利者就在这些提交了计划的用户中产生。胜利者可能付政府一笔费用，尽管可能最想购买频谱的潜在用户不一定在胜利者中。例如，90年代英国就使用“选美比赛”的方法颁发了2G牌照。瑞典和西班牙也用这种方法颁发了3G牌照。法国用同样的方法颁发了四个3G牌照。国家电信的管理者要求公司必须于2001年一月低之前提交申请。这些申请将会被根据事先定好的标准评级，并打分，总分为500。这些标准包括就业率（25分）、服务（多达50分）以及部署速度（多达100分）胜出的公司必须支付政府设定的高额牌照使用费。最后，只有两家公司提出了申请。它们2001年六月拿到了牌照，剩下的两个无人问津。利用市场机制来配置频谱使用劝和预防电磁干扰的概念可以最少追述到50年代，先后由Herzel(1951)和Coase(1959)提出。
但当频谱拍卖普及的时候，已经过去三十多年了。新西兰1989年修改了法律允许拍卖频谱，到了90年代早期，与移动电话，电视，无线电广播以及其他私人无线服务有关的频谱分配也开始采用拍卖的方式。1993年八月分，美国修改法律允许FCC通过拍卖颁发无线频谱牌照，到96年七月分FCC已经举行了七次拍卖，颁发了2100张牌照，包括通过两次拍卖颁发的两张全美范围的2G牌照。2000年，英国拍卖了5张3G牌照，共计大约$34b。拍卖有一系列不同的形式，有新西兰的第二价格密封出价，美国的改性升序出价和混合升序出价以及英国的荷 兰式拍卖。
竞标者在参加拍卖时必须满足一定的标准，比如服务保障和参与保证金。在一定区域一个公司能够拍得的牌照数量是有限的，防止垄断。从经济学角度来说，频谱拍卖能够确保频谱在用户手中发挥最大价值。虽然频谱能拍卖到不同的用户手中，但依然要优先集中保证一些特殊用途对于一些频谱的获得权。
从市场角度来说，这可能会导致频谱使用的效率低下。一个特定波段的用户可能愿意出更高的价钱购买与其相邻的波段，而这个波段确已经被其他用户购得。但是一些波段的优先分配能够保证这些用户无法通过相互交易而获利。根据现有的牌照使用章程，即使是双赢，用户也不能随意更改频谱的用途作他用。
Coase(1959), Valletti(2001)提出了一个频谱所有劝相互贸易的系统，能利用市场在分配频谱用途的同时确定用户。电磁干扰问题也能通过相邻频谱所有者之间的产权分配和谈判解决。Valletti 说过无论是竞争问题还是法定标准问题都只能由频谱使用权的这个市场来解决。接下来我们讨论的是标准问题，竞争的问题将会在下面的第5部分讨论。Noam(1997)进一步发展了可交易频谱分配这一概念。
由于技术进步，信号可以在发送端打包成很多单独的数据信息而在接受端又可以重新聚合，这就意味着永久性的频谱分配在不久将来显的很多余。在此基础上，Noam提出特定频段分配可以通过市场完成。这样频谱用途的价格就能反映出其用途的实际价值。DeVany(1998)也涉及过基于市场的频谱分配政策，出了未来建立一个开放、商用、非绑定的频谱市场体系的可能。美国FCC的频谱拍卖一直是冲突不断。参与拍卖的1850-1910 MHz 和 1930-1990MHz波段已经有了私人固定点对点用户。FCC最后决定现有的用户有最多三年的时间与新的用户谈判可替代频谱和补偿问题。如果谈判失败，现有用户将被强制重新分配。
Cramton, Kwerel and Williams(1998)调查了一系列现有频谱重新分配的替代选择，发现美国重新分配的情况大致相当于讨价还价。虽然经济学家一般都提倡频谱分配要通过拍卖，可拍卖依然饱受批评。Binmore 和 Klemperer(2002)认为很多反对拍卖的观点都被误解了。但是Noam(1997)都Gruber(2001b)批评说频谱拍卖导致了垄断，竞争力不足。而Gruber认为技术进步提高了频谱使用的效率，增加了无线服务的竞争力。例如，从频谱使用效率来看，GSM移动电话大约是早期模拟系统的40到50倍。频谱拍卖是在频谱分配之后进行的。政府通常先分配固定的频段给一些适当服务。然后，再决定这一频段内拍卖的牌照的数量。所以拍卖的价格和无线服务的竞争力是由频谱数量和政府事先分配给这项服务的牌照数量共同决定的。虽然拍卖导致了对于稀缺频谱的竞争，但依然不能靠市场决定竞争的最好形式。Noam认为，为了克服人为的市场的不公平，分配体系应具有进入的灵活性。
3.2 频谱使用补偿作用
基于频谱的无线通信服务容易导致服务与服务之间以及地区和地区之间的协合作用。Binmore 和 Klemperer 就曾提到英国的3G频谱拍卖可能存在2G和3G移动通信基础设施的协合作用。在2G电信产业，相对于后来者，现有的电信企业拥有巨大的优势。不仅仅是现存企业2G生意对于3G的补偿，而且运营3G需要的建设基础的成本，现存企业也比后来者少的多，因为他们可以在现有2G的基础设施上进行建设。因此，在能否利用现存品牌向消费者提供新的产品和2G 以及 3G的服务之间存在协合作用。
地域间的协合作用能从FCC的2G 拍卖中很明显的看出来。Moreton 和 Spiller(1998)研究过美国1995-96年中的两次移动电话拍卖。为了获得一定牌照地区的人口数量，有竞争力和规范的环境以及任何协和作用的效果，他们对每个牌照采取了反向递减的拍卖形式。同样也有升序拍卖，这样最后的牌照成交价格就大致等于最后一位竟标者的出价。显然，相关协和作用是和最后一位的竟标者的网络有关的，在出价的基础上发挥这一网络的最大作用。为了获得地域协和作用的效果，Moreton 和 Spiller假设竟标者事实上拍得的网络与其期待的完全相同。
他们把地理协同作用分为本地和全球。本地协和考虑的是某地区的牌照价值与其相邻地区2G牌照所有者的关系。全球协和考虑的是最终意义上的胜出者拍得的全国性网络。Moreton 和 Spiller 发现了本地协和的存在。“在本地协和中，我们发现对于单独一个竟标者和几个竟标者来说，若干组两个或两个以上相邻的牌照显然对于前者更有价值。当在一个地区内增加想邻的牌照时，本地协调却急剧下降，而全球协调则微弱。在Moreton 和 Spiller的研究当中，现存蜂窝服务的本地覆盖能降低2G牌照的费用。这似乎和Binmore 和Klemperer关于不同移动电话服务之间的经济领域理论相冲突。Moreton 和Spiller认为负面关系可能反映竞争的减少。公司都不愿意投资更多与现存的模拟移动电话公司竞争，而是愿意把他们有限的资源使用在其他地方。可是，这一 理论有点牵强。
在升序拍卖中，竟标者都会根据自己的评估出价，如果说在现存的模拟电话服务和2G服务中存在积极的协和，那么无论其他竟标者出什么价格，最后，牌照的价值只能是中标者的出价。正如Moreton 和 Spiller的发现一样，2G牌照的价格与市场的人口数量和人口增长率成正比，与其服务的地区大小成反比。这些发现只是一些感性研究，与Ausubel的发现大体上一致。人口和需求好象总是积极相连，所以无论哪个层次的竞争，增加的人口总是会增加利润。但无论有多少人口，更大的区域只会增加建设2G蜂窝网络的成本，降低利润。Moreton 和Spiller的研究还表明，管理者对于现存模拟电话网络税收的管辖权总是会增加2G牌照的价格。这表明现有服务的税收政策削弱了竞争，整体上推高了服务价格。
管理者的通告和有关价格信息的出版物可能削弱竞争的现象，已经在其它产业中表现出来。
