非复原性损失赔偿_非民法性赔偿
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非复原性损失赔偿序言非复原损失赔偿之一：惩罚性损失赔偿（exemplary 或 punitive damages）2.1 英国普通法的地位 2.2 美国法律的地位
2.3 加大损失与惩罚性损失的区别 2.4 加大损失
2.4.1 加大损失适用的侵权案件类别 2.4.2 估计加大损失的难处 2.4.3 加大损失不适用在合约 2.4.4 加大损失也不适用在侵权的疏忽 2.5 加大损失与惩罚性损失的区分不明显
2.6 Rookes v Barnard先例后允许的三种例外情况可导致惩罚性损失赔偿 2.6.1 例外情况之一：政府官员的压迫性，随意性或违反宪法的行为 2.6.2 例外情况之二：侵权行为是侵权方计算过好处大过坏处 2.6.3 例外情况之三：立法规定 2.7 核算惩罚性损失应去考虑的因素 2.7.1 考虑因素之一：真正受害人作为原告 2.7.2 考虑因素之二：适度的赔偿 2.7.3 考虑因素之三：当事人的财力
2.7.4 考虑因素之四：避免与刑事诉讼去作出重复的惩罚 2.7.5 考虑因素之五：当事人的行为 2.7.6 考虑因素之六：复原赔偿的金额 2.7.7 考虑因素之七：多位被告 2.7.8 考虑因素之八：多位原告
2.8 合约下的惩罚性损失赔偿：英国法律地位 2.8.1什么是惩罚性损失赔偿条文 2.8.1.1 惩罚性损失赔偿条文是为了阻吓
2.8.1.2 不涉及金钱赔偿而是针对违约会带来更苛刻条件或更高昂对价也会是惩罚性条文
2.8.1.3 不为了阻吓合约对方违约的条文不属于惩罚性损失赔偿 2.8.1.4 议定赔偿金额低过真正损失的估计不属于惩罚性损失赔偿条文 2.8.1.5 惩罚性损失赔偿条文不影响受害方索赔真正蒙受的损失 2.8.1.6 举证责任与其他考虑 2.8.2 议定赔偿条文的好处
2.8.3 议定赔偿条文是否惩罚性损失赔偿条文？ 2.8.4 怎样去区分合约的一般议定赔偿条文与惩罚性条文 2.8.4.1 区分原则之一：条文的标题并不重要
2.8.4.2 区分原则之二：约定的金额比真正损失大为去威吓一方当事人不敢去违约 2.8.4.3 区分原则之三：判断是否惩罚性条文是去看订约一刻的情况 2.8.4.4 区分原则之四：其他帮助区分的考虑
2.8.4.4.1 将来可能发生的违约最大的损失也低于约定的金额 2.8.4.4.2 对纯金钱债务约定比债务更高的赔偿金额
2.8.4.4.3 对于大小及严重程度不一的多种违约约定一个单一的赔偿金额 2.8.4.4.4 真正损失很难估计的情况
2.8.4.4.5 一连串合约中的中间方（party in between）2.8.4.4.6 针对同一种违约有不同金额的议定赔偿 2.9 订金（deposit）与预付（pre-payment）2.9.1 订金会有危险被视为是惩罚性损失赔偿 2.9.2 有关先例之一: Stockloser v.Johnson 2.9.3有关先例之二: Linggi Plantations Ltd v.Jagatheesan 2.9.4有关先例之三：Workers Trust and Merchant Bank Ltd v Dojap Investments Ltd 2.9.5有关先例之四：Union Eagle Ltd v Golden Achievement Ltd 2.10英国法院近期对惩罚性条文的放宽 2.11 近期部分有关惩罚性条文先例的介绍
2.11.1 先例之一：General Trading Company v Richmond Corp Ltd 2.11.2先例之二：The “Paragon”
2.11.3 先例之三：Tandrin Aviation Holdings Ltd v Aero Toy Store 3 非复原损失赔偿之二：“返还性损失”（restitutionary damages）3.1作出“返还性损失”的理由
3.2早期有关返还性救济的部分侵权案例或说法 3.3合约的返还性损失赔偿
3.3.1先例之一：Wrotham Park Estate Co v Parkside Homes 3.3.2先例之二：Attorney General v Blake
3.3.3先例之三：Experience Hendrix v PPX Enterprises Inc 3.3.4先例之四：WWF World Life Fund for Nature v World Wrestling Federation Entertainment Inc 3.4合约关系去作出返还性救济的利弊
3.4.1可能作出返还性损失赔偿的三种违约的情况
3.4.2 总结有关返还性损失与交出利润在合约关系下的不肯定 3.5其他方面的考虑之一：被告是否是故意与值得批评的违约 3.6其他方面的考虑之二：有否及时向法院申请禁令 3.7其他方面的考虑之三：返还性损失的金额非复原损失赔偿之三：名义性损失赔偿（nominal damages）
非复原性损失赔偿序言
本章是去介绍非复原性损失赔偿的不同类别。众所周知，英国法律针对民事诉讼（不论是侵权或是合约关系）对损失计算的基本大原则就是“复原”（restitutio in integrum 或compensatory principle）。这里著名的说法是在先例Livingstone v.Rawyards Coal Co.(1880)5 App.Cas.25，BlackBurn勋爵说：“that sum of money which will put the party who has been injured, or who has suffered, in the same position as he would have been in if he had not sustained the wrong for which he is now getting his compensation or reparation”。在合约关系的说法是“尽量用金钱来令受害方回到一个合约被履行的地位”（as far as money can do it, to be placed, in the same position as if the contract had been performed）。也有说法是合约方有两个合约责任，第一个就是去履行他所作出的合约承诺，第二个或是替代的合约责任就是去赔偿对方因为没有去履行而蒙受的损失。
这一个损失计算的大原则也包括了不去理会侵权或违约方是否通过这种错误行为而赚取到的利润，只理会赔偿受害方的损失。这是Megarry V.C.大法官在Tito v Waddell(No.2)(1977)Ch.106所说的：“It is fundamental to all questions of damages that they are to compensate the plaintiff for his lo or injury … The question is not one of making the defendant disgorge what he has saved by committing the wrong, but one of compensating the plaintiff”。
英国法律也不愿意对侵权或违约方作出惩罚去让无辜方获利，认为作出惩罚只是属于刑法的范畴，与民事诉讼无关。而刑事与民事之间有许多的不同，包括在举证责任，不应该去混淆。
但凡事都有例外，所以在英国法律，民事诉讼也慢慢发展出各种非复原性赔偿的做法。这包括是重要的“惩罚性损失赔偿”（exemplary 或 punitive damages），新出现的“返还性损失赔偿”（restitutionary damages）与“名义性损失赔偿”（nominal damages）。他们会在接下去的段节去探讨。其中谈到惩罚性损失赔偿，也会去探讨在Rookes v Barnard(1964)AC 1129先例后被区分出来的“加大损失”（aggravated damages），说是属于复原性赔偿。但这一类损失也顺便去包括在本章的内容，而且加大损失还是会与惩罚性损失有点分不开。此外，本章也会去探讨与商业合约有密切关系的惩罚性条文，这包括了议定赔偿条文与订金等方面的问题。非复原损失赔偿之一：惩罚性损失赔偿（exemplary 或 punitive damages）
2.1 英国普通法的地位
一般的说法是，英国法律在侵权与违约一般都不准去索赔惩罚性损失。英国认为惩罚性损失不妥之处会是：
（Ⅰ）它给受害方一个发大财的机会，经常脱离了“复原”的补偿（compensation）精神。
（Ⅱ）惩罚性损失与民事诉讼没有关系，这是刑事诉讼的范畴。
（III）惩罚在刑事诉讼是需要举证至认定“没有任何合理的怀疑”（beyond reasonable doubt），愈严重的刑事，经常见到无法成功举证入罪，有任何疑点都会去把利益归被告所有。但民事诉讼只需要举证以“衡量可能性”（balance of probability）为尺度，等于是法院或仲裁员认为有51%的可能性该争议的事实是正确，就可以去认定。换言之，举证尺度宽松得多，但也常会在现实中带来判错的情况，这是在刑事诉讼不能接受。如果再去加上金额庞大的惩罚性损失赔偿，但只要求相对低多了的举证责任，会造成混乱，轻率，不公的情况。
（IV）如果在一个不法的行为中，侵权方的被告要去面对两次惩罚，这包括了刑事诉讼与民事诉讼，这是违反基本的公正大原则 AB v South West Water Services(1993)QB507 CA;Devenish Nutrition Ltd v Sanofi-Aventis SA(2008)2 WLR 637”。
（V）它也带来不稳定，和解困难与鼓励诉讼。毕竟，这惩罚性损失会是完全要靠“臆猜”，这特别是在陪审团去作出金额的判决。
有关惩罚性损失赔偿是否应该保留或是去扩大适用范围，在英国是一个相当有争议的话题。例如法律委员会在1997年的报告Report on Aggravated, Exemplary and Restitutionary Damages, Law Commiion No.247，就显示了持相反意见的各半。另在Kuddus v Chief Constable of Leicestershire(2002)2 AC 122先例，Scott勋爵认为第一种例外情况的惩罚性损失赔偿已经有了“加大损失”（aggravated damages）的替代，而第二种例外情况已经有了“返还性损失”（restitutionary damages）的替代。所以，英国的“民事法再也不需要惩罚性损失赔偿”（no longer any need for punitive damages in the civil law）。但贵族院的Nicholls勋爵与Hutton勋爵认为还是需要保留第一种例外情况的惩罚性损失赔偿。另Slynn勋爵与Mackay勋爵认为这不是双方争议的问题，不必去作出决定。
2.2 美国法律的地位
美国虽然也是一个普通法的国家，在1760年开始就依从当时英国法院开始作出惩罚性损失赔偿的先例。但英国在60年代的Rookes v Barnard(1964)AC 1129和Broome v Caell & Co(1971)2 QB 354 CA的贵族院先例后大幅度收紧对惩罚性损失赔偿，而美国却没有继续依从。在美国，不论是在普通法或者是在不同的立法，都会允许去作出惩罚性损失赔偿。例如1951年的RICO法案（Racketteer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act）已有好几次延展到航运的租约纠纷，令受害方获得真正损失的三倍“赔偿”，以作为惩罚违约方。美国这种惩罚性损失赔偿，常有所闻，如近期的香港九仓公司有关有线电视的业务被“罚”上亿美元去赔给一家美国公司，只为了是一个破坏口头协议之争，这种争议本来就是“罗生门”，法官可随意去相信那一方证人。难怪外国人对美国法院的管辖权闻虎色变，视之为合法“抢劫”。
所以在美国的民事诉讼中经常会涉及惩罚性损失赔偿，美国的最高院先例State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co v.Campbell(2003)538 U.S.408，Kennedy大法官说“惩罚性损失赔偿是为了针对阻吓与报应”（punitive damages are aimed at deterrence and retribution）。但英国法律就很难接受这一个说法，因为去针对侵权方或违约方，作出阻吓并不让他去继续或重复这一个错误的行为，在私人的范畴，受害方是完全可以去法院尽快申请禁令。而对于公众的范畴，政府也可以代表去法院申请禁令。这一来，完全只是个人权利的民事诉讼，就没有理由去混淆这一个阻吓与报应的理念，为了希望被告以后不要再去重复这种侵权或者违约，这样做混淆了公法与私法之间的区别。Scott勋爵在2008年的Chancery Bar Aociation的关于损失的发言中提到了这一点，说：
“…The law will have become incoherent.That may well have become the case in the US.But it must not be allowed to become the case here.The way to make sure it does not awarded.If deterrence is the purpose, whose are the rights that are being protected? If protection of the rights of the public at large is the purpose, or if punishment of the wrongdoer is the purpose, are those legitimate purposes to be pursued by a civil court in a private action brought on account of the infringement of the claimant‘s personal rights?”。
在美国，这一个惩罚性损失赔偿也带来了很多不稳定与压力。美国最高院也有不少尝试去改善这一个情况，例如去局限惩罚性损失赔偿的金额。在State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co v.Campbell(2003)538 U.S.408先例，案情涉及了一个交通事故中，保险公司恶意拒绝赔偿。第一审的陪审团判保险公司要赔付2,600,000美元的赔偿性损失加145,000,000美元。但这被法官减为1,000,000美元加25,000,000。上诉去了犹他州的最高院，去把惩罚性损失赔偿重新提高为陪审团判的145,000,000美元。最后在美国最高院，多数意见判是145,000,000美元的惩罚性损失赔偿实在是太高，这样判也违反了美国宪法的“正当程序”（due proce）。
这一个先例与著名作家John Grisham的一本畅销书《The Rainmaker》的情节也差不多，涉及了一个保险公司故意拒赔的案件。在书中，提到了原告的律师如何去在开庭前培训证人（原告）应对盘问（这种做法在英国法院是不容许的），其中最重要的是不要让陪审团感觉到原告索赔惩罚性损失赔偿是为了贪心。在正式开庭的时候，果然代表保险公司的律师提出了这一个盘问，但原告的律师所指导的回应是“我对你的臭钱一毛钱也不想要，我将会把所有的惩罚性损失赔偿捐给白血病研究(I don‘t want a dime of your goddam money, I‘m going to give the whole sum to leukaemia research.)”。看来原告在出庭的时候做戏也做的好，果然陪审团是判保险公司要赔付这40,000,000美元的惩罚性损失赔偿。
《The Rainmaker》出版后不久，在俄亥俄州（Ohio）有另一个名为Moore v.Conrail(1997)863 F.2d 45，原告的孩子被火车撞死，原告向被告索赔1千万美元的惩罚性损失赔偿并声称这笔钱会捐给一个针对改善道路安全的慈善机构，并获得胜诉。不久后，在另一个先例，名为Dardinger v.Anthem(2002)781 NE 2d 121，在同类的案件中，俄亥俄州的最高院自己去把原告胜诉的部分惩罚性损失赔偿去判给慈善机构而不是给原告。这看来是为了原告在开庭的时候讲这种好听的话，但获得赔偿后就根本不去履行。但这在另一个俄勒冈州（Oregon）的最高院，在Honeywell v.Sterling Furniture Co(1990)797 P 2d 1019，判是原告即使是有意图去把惩罚性损失赔偿捐作慈善性用途，也不准去告诉陪审团。此外，法院也没有权力去把判给原告的惩罚性损失赔偿去部分转给任何其他机构包括慈善性机构。看来，去统一判法的话最后还是要看美国最高院的最后决定。
2.3 加大损失与惩罚性损失的区别
在进一步讲这一方面的问题之前，先去把几个有一点混淆的名堂去稍微作出区分。这几个名堂就是“加大损失”（aggravated damages）、“惩戒性损失”（exemplary damages）“惩罚性损害”（vindictive damages）、“报复性损失”（retributory damages）与“惩罚性损失”（punitive damages）。可以说在Rookes v Barnard(1964)AC 1129的贵族院先例之前，上述的名堂都是混为一谈。但在该先例后，就去把加大损失区分出来，视为是符合“复原大原则”（compensatory principle），只是去针对“无形损失”（intangible loes），就免不了要去在一定程度作出臆猜。但如果在一个涉及疏忽的交通事故中，无辜的行人如果身体受到实际伤害可以去获得赔偿（例如医疗费用或经济损失），就没有理由说是因为难去核算，对他受到其他无形或非金钱的损失例如是“疼痛和苦难”（pain and suffering）和“心理创伤”（psychological injury）等不去作出赔偿。但其余的名堂如惩戒性损失、惩罚性损害、报复性损失与惩罚性损失，还是同一码事，这些损失赔偿与复原大原则没有关系。
2.4 加大损失
加大损失说是符合民事诉讼的损失赔偿必须是按照“复原大原则”（compensatory principle）是可去Scott勋爵在2008年的Chancery Bar Aociation的关于损失的发言中是这样说：
“It is in this context that reference to ‗aggravated‘ damages is often made.Aggravated damages are awarded for the purpose of providing compensation for conduct which has increased the seriousne of the wrong inflicted on the victim and, accordingly, increased the degree of the result for which compensation must be paid.The function of so-called ‗aggravated‘ damages remains compensatory.Aggravated damages are not – repeat not – extra-compensatory damages.The purpose of the award should be compensation for what has happened.”
2.4.1 加大损失适用的侵权案件类别
加大损失被视为是赔偿性，符合民事诉讼中损失计算的复原大原则，虽然它是用来针对一些受害人的一些“无形伤害”（intangible injury），例如是“侮辱”（insult）、“羞辱”（humiliation）、“降级”（degradation）、“气愤”（indignation）、“激怒”（outrage）、“痛苦”（distre）、“伤害情感”（hurt feelings）、“歧视”（discrimination）、等。此外，加大损失也适用在其他的侵权，并且有明确的先例，例如是：
（i）“诽谤”（defamation）：Ley v Hamilton(1935)153 LT 384;McCarey v Aociated Newspapers Ltd.(No.2)(1965)2 QB 86;Broome v Caell(1972)AC 1027；
（ii）“殴打”（battery）：Ansell v Thomas, The Times, 23 May 1973;Flavius v Metropolitan Police Commiioner(1982)132 NLJ 532;Ballard v Metropolitan Police Commiioner(1983)133 NLJ 1133;W v Meah(1986)1 All ER 935)；
（iii）“非法禁锢”（false imprisonment）：Smith v Metropolitan Police Commiioner(1982)CLY 899;Warby v Cascarina, The Times, 27 October 1989;Barnes v Metropolitan Police Commiioner(July 1992)Legal Action 14;White v Metropolitan Police Commiioner, The Times, 24 April 1982；
（iv）“恶意起诉”（malicious prosecution）：White v Metropolitan Police Commiioner, The Times, 24 April 1982;Marks v Chief Constable of Greater Manchester(1992)TLR 23；（v）“恐吓”（intimidation）：Meenger Newspapers Group Ltd.v National Graphical Aociation(1984)IRLR 397;Godwin v Uzoigwe(1992)TLR 300；
（vi）“歧视”（discrimination）：Alexander v Home Office(1988)1 WLR 968;Morris v Higgs & Hill Building Ltd.(Jan/Feb 1992)41 Equal Opportunities Review, 30;Duffy v Eastern Health & Social Services Board(1992)IRLR 251;Hynes v Warner Howard Ltd.(March 1993)Legal Action 18；
（vii）“侵入土地”（trespa to land）：Merest v Harvey(1814)5 Taunt.442;Sears v Lyons(1818)2 Stark.317;Williams v Currie(1845)1 CB 841;Emblen v Myers(1860)6 H.& N.54;Drane v Evangelou(1978)1 WLR 455；
（viii）“欺骗”（deceit）：Mafo v Adams(1970)1 QB 548;Archer v Brown(1985)QB 401；（ix）“滋扰”（nuisance）：Thompson v Hill(1870)LR 5 CP 564；
（x）“非法干预商业活动”（unlawful interference with busine）：Meenger Newspapers Group Ltd v National Graphical Aociation(1984)IRLR 397；
2.4.2 估计加大损失的难处
涉及了这种无形伤害，要去把它量化为金钱的赔偿，是免不了有很大的困难。这里主要的困难是来自每一个不同的案例都“不能比较”（incommensurability），这导致了判决的不稳定与无法让当事人预测结果，这些也不是好事。另一个困难是“主观与受害人难以证明”（subjectivity or difficulties of proof）。这在一定程度上与人身伤亡会一并带来“非金钱损害”（non-pecuniary harm）例如是“疼痛和苦难”（pain and suffering）、“失去欢乐”（lo of amenity）和“心理创伤”（psychological injury）等。但后者的程度比前者的加大损失是好得多，因为后者案件已经在section 6 of the Administration of Justice(Miscellaneous Provisions)Act 1933与之后的section 69 of the Supreme Court Act 1981已经不再由陪审团去审理人身伤亡的案件，而是交由法院，而法院已经发展出来一个量刑标准针对各种不同人身伤亡会带来的疼痛和苦难或心理创伤。
2.4.3 加大损失不适用在合约
加大损失对本章或本书所想去重点针对的合约关系是不大，而商务关系都离不开是一个一个合约串起来。原因是加大损失是不适用在违约，因为合约是严格适用金钱赔偿作为“复原”（compensatory）大原则，合约也只是关心“金钱损失”（pecuniary damages）：Addis v Gramophone Co.Ltd(1909)AC 488;Kralj v McGrath(1986)1 All ER 54;Levi v Gordon, 12 November 1992(Unreported, CA)。就算是违约同时涉及了被告对受害方原告的“侮辱”或 “羞辱”，也不能适用加大损失的救济。至于在违约的受害方会因此而感觉到失望，受挫与压力等，这都属于双方在订约时可以想象得到违约会带来的后果，都不能去索赔加大损失：Bli v SE Thames RHA(1987)ICR 700;Hayes v James & Charles Dodd(1990)2 All ER 815;Branchett v Beaney(1992)3 All ER 910。在Watts v Morrow(1991)1 WLR 1421先例，上诉庭的Bingham大法官说：“(1)A contract-breaker is not in general liable for any distre, frustration, anxiety, displeasure, vexation, tension or aggravation which his breach of contract may cause to the innocent party.This rule is not, I think, founded on the aumption that such reactions are not foreseeable, which they surely are or may be, but on considerations of policy.(2)But the rule is not absolute.Where the very object of a contract is to provide pleasure（例如是度假、游轮等的合约）, relaxation, peace of mind or freedom from molestation, damages will be awarded if the fruit of the contract is not provided or if the contrary result is procured instead.If the law did not cater for this exceptional category of case it would be defective.A contract to survey the condition of a house for a prospective purchaser does not, however, fall within this exceptional category.”
唯一的特殊例外是原告可以以侵权作为替代诉因去向被告索赔加大损失，因为是涉及了侮辱性的违约，这尤其在房屋的租客与业主之间的诉讼，涉及了业主延误失修导致了租客的日子难过：Calabar Properties Ltd v Stitcher(1984)1 WLR 287。或是，租客得不到“安静的享用”（quiet enjoyment），导致业主是犯了“侵入”（trespa）或“滋扰”（nuisance）的侵权行为。
2.4.4 加大损失也不适用在侵权的疏忽
另外，在涉及了“疏忽”（negligence）的侵权案件，也不适用加大损失的救济：Kralj v McGrath(1986)1 All ER 54;AB v South West Water Services Ltd(1993)QB 507。这是因为加大损失只适用在侵权方被告的“不正常行为”（exceptional conduct），而显然被告光是疏忽是没有什么太不正常之处。
2.5 加大损失与惩罚性损失的区分不明显
话是说加大损失不违反复原大原则，但在现实中加大损失还是经常与惩罚性损失分不开。在无数的先例中只去节录Morris v Higgs and Hill Building Ltd.(Jan/Feb 1992)41 Equal Opportunities Review, 30,33有关非法解雇的先例。该先例的“感情伤害”（injury to feelings）赔偿是4000英镑，另加大损失是2000英镑，而裁判庭对加大损失的原因是如下：“The factors which have led us to make this increased award are firstly, that the respondents advertised the job behind her back, something which she found out about.This is an extremely insulting and high-handed and oppreive thing to do.Secondly, there is the manner of her dismial, sending her a letter whilst she was away on holiday to await her return, which was bound to cause the maximum amount of shock and distre.Thirdly, since the application was made the respondents have persisted in various untrue allegations, both about her work and about her conduct, and fourthly, the company as a whole … have failed to acknowledge the wider problems which have been exposed by this case in their lack of fair procedures and by the absence of any equal opportunities policy and have taken no steps to try and install such a policy”。
在上述计算加大损失的四个原因，只有一个是有关受害方原告的伤害。显然，其他原因就有很强的惩罚性味道。这也在许多说法中接受的现实，例如有关最高院对诽谤的一个报告Supreme Court Procedure Committee‘s Report on Practice and Procedure in Defamation(1991)，就说到：“We think that in those cases where a defendant‘s behaviour particularly merits disapproval the jury can adequately deal with this by an award of aggravated damages without stepping outside the notion of compensation”。难怪是在Rookes v Barnard(1964)AC 1129和Broome v Caell(1972)AC 1027两个先例之前的两百年，有许多侵权诉讼（但没有违约方面）被认为是判惩罚性损失赔偿的先例都被这两个贵族院先例所推翻。认为英国法律下民事诉讼是不能去作出惩罚性损失赔偿，惩罚只是刑事诉讼的范畴。但实际上上述两个先例也没有推翻许多以前的先例，只是对损失的叫法有了不同。以前被称为是惩罚性损失的先例，实际上是加大损失，属于复原大原则，在一定程度上是换汤不换药。
2.6 Rookes v Barnard先例后允许的三种例外情况可导致惩罚性损失赔偿
在Rookes v Barnard(1964)AC 1129先例，贵族院去全面检讨了有关刑事诉讼后认为不应该允许在英国的民事诉讼继续去作出惩罚性损失赔偿的决定，而主要原因就是这会把民事诉讼与刑事诉讼的区分造成混淆。但贵族院也认为有例外情况，并去说明有三种情况是可以判惩罚性损失赔偿，原因是Devlin大法官所说的能起到一定的作用：“in which an award of exemplary damages can serve a useful purpose in vindicating the strength of the law and thus affording a practical justification for admitting into the civil law a principle which ought logically to belong to the criminal”。
Rookes v Barnard先例稍后在Broome v Caell先例曾在上诉庭受到质疑，但这被贵族院改正，并明确支持Rookes v Barnard说：“not prepared to follow the Court of Appeal in its criticisms of Rookes v Barnard, which … imposed valuable limits on the doctrine of exemplary damages as they had hitherto been understood in English law and clarified important questions which had previously been undiscued or left confused”。
这一来，英国法律在这两个贵族院先例是明确了不允许在民事诉讼中支持惩罚性损失赔偿。至于Rookes v Barnard先例认为三种例外情况是允许惩罚性损失赔偿是：（1）政府官员的压迫性，随意性或违反宪法的行为（oppreive, arbitrary or unconstitutional conduct by government servants）；（2）侵权行为是侵权方计算过好处大过坏处，也就是侵权会带来更大的经济利益（conduct calculated to result in profit）；（3）立法明示允许作出惩罚性损失赔偿（expre authorization by statute）。这三种例外情况与商务合约的关系都是没有或不大，但可以去简单作出介绍。
2.6.1 例外情况之一：政府官员的压迫性，随意性或违反宪法的行为
在第一种例外情况，认为是要保留惩罚性损失赔偿的原因主要是为了防止政府官员的独行独断，去保护小市民。Devlin勋爵是这样说：“where one man is more powerful than another, it is inevitable that he will try to use his power to gain his ends;and if his power is much greater than the other‘s, he might, perhaps, be said to be using it oppreively.If he uses his power illegally, he must of course pay for his illegality in the ordinary way;but he is not to be punished simply because he is the more powerful.In the case of the government it is different, for the servants of the government are also the servants of the people and the use of their power must always be subordinate to their duty of service”。在这一种例外情况，是要去看两个方面。第一是有关的行为是否压迫性或是随意性或是违反宪法。如果政府官员光是疏忽，这是不足够：Barbara v Home Office(1984)134 NLJ 888;AB v South West Water Services Ltd(1993)QB 507。第二个方面是指针对政府官员例如是政府官员或最容易与小市民发生摩擦的警察（也是在英国法院最常见涉及惩罚性损失赔偿的被告），但看来不包括根据立法或者政府部门通过私有化去达致商业目标所成立的企业或机构，例如是供应水、电的企业：AB v South West Water Services Ltd。会与商业活动有关的政府官员会是在“民间搜查令”（Anton Piller order）下的申请人代表律师，因为他在执行的时候是被视为是法院的官员：Columbia Picture Industries Inc.v Robinson(1987)Ch 38。
上述所讲也带来了困难，第一种困难是许多大公司例如是警卫，他们会作出与警察一样的行动而且是同样的压迫性与偶然性，例如是非法禁锢或非法搜身，但向他们索赔损失就会不一样：加拿大Mckinnon v FW Woolworth Co.Ltd(1968)70 DLR(2d)280先例。第二种困难是判政府官员或警察要作出惩罚性损失赔偿，但该笔钱是要政府去掏出来，变了是广大市民所交的税去最后承担。这有一点说不通，在Weldon v Home Office(1992)1 AC 58和Racz v Home Office(1992)TLR 624先例，判是政府官员如果是明知故犯或恶意的情况下，要自己去承担赔偿责任。
2.6.2 例外情况之二：侵权行为是侵权方计算过好处大过坏处
在第二种例外情况，是侵权方估计侵权会带来更大的经济利益，但根据复原大原则的赔偿会是有限，所以去刻意作出侵权行为。这种行动法律要去作出阻吓就要去作出惩罚性损失赔偿，正如Devlin勋爵在Rookes v Barnard先例中所说：“Exemplary damages can properly be awarded whenever it is neceary to teach a wrongdoer that tort does not pay”。Delvin勋爵在Rookes & Barnard也有以下进一步的解释：
“with a cynical disregard for a plaintiff‘s rights has calculated that the money to be made out of his wrongdoing will probably exceed the damages at risk, it is neceary for the law to show that it cannot be broken with impunity.This category is not confined to money making in the strict sense.It extends to cases in which the defendant is seeking to gain at the expense of the plaintiff some object-perhaps some property which he covets-which he either could not obtain at all or not obtained except at a price greater than he wants to put down.”
这种案件涉及报纸、杂志看来是有不少，就是去刊登一些很可能造成诽谤的“内幕消息”，为了去刺激销量：McCarey v Aociated Newspapers(1965)2 QB 86 CA;Broadway Approvals v Odhams Pre(1965)1 WLR 805 CA;Manson v Aociated Newspapers(1965)1 WLR 1038;Broome v Caell & Co.(1972)AC 1027;Riches v News Group Newspapers(1986)QB 256 CA;John v MGN(1997)QB 586 CA。这种情况，在香港的娱乐杂志也经常会见到。
有说法是在第二种情况实际上与“返还性损失”（restitutionary damages）一样，没有必要存在。这可去节录《McGregor on Damages》（第十八版，2009年）一书11-029段：“It is true that the awarding of exemplary damages is a somewhat makeshift and arbitrary method of preventing a tortfeasor‘s unjust enrichment, especially as it is dependent on the motivation of profit rather than its achievement.It may be that the emergence of restitutionary damages, particularly since Attorney General v Blake(2001)1 AC 268, will take us beyond waiver of tort and account of profits to allow claimants a more direct recovery without the need to resort to, in this context, the rather clumsy device of exemplary damages”。
这种例子令笔者记得80年代著名的福特汽车厂明知故犯，知道某车型号气缸有问题，会爆炸带来伤亡，但仔细计算过将来面对起诉要作出赔偿，经济上仍比马上收回所有出售了的车子来改装划算。注意是个别车主与汽车厂应有分销商夹在当中，所以他们之间关系不会是根据合约。遇上这种情形，不要说美国会肯定有惩罚性损失赔偿，连英国也会逃不掉，法律以此来表达对这种做法的极度不满。
但在做法上，目前对惩罚性损失赔偿的判决通常是不会去考虑侵权方的利润，也没有这方面的证据。例如在Mcmillan v Singh(1984)17 HLR 120先例，上诉庭判惩罚性损失赔偿是250英镑，但被告的利润只是在60-70英镑内。
2.6.3 例外情况之三：立法规定
在第三种例外情况的立法包括有：The Landlord and Tenant Act 1730;the Distre for Rent Act 1737;the Reserve and Auxiliary Forces(Protection of Civil Interests)Act 1951和比较近期的the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988。其中在1988年针对版权与专利的立法，Section 97(2)说：
“The court may in action for infringement of copyright having regard to all the circumstances, and in particular to-(a)the flagrancy of the infringement, and
(b)any benefit accruing to the defendant by reason of the infringement, award such additional damages as the justice of the case may require”。
上述立法的“额外损失”（additional damages）是否可以针对惩罚性损失是很有争议，看来立法的用词是不够明确。这些争议在《McGregor on Damages》（第十八版，2009年）一书11-032段有介绍，笔者不去节录，因为与中国大陆的读者关系很小。
另在1998年《英国人权法》之section 8授权法院说到公共机构如果违反有关条文的话，法院应该去作出一个“合理的满足”（just satisfaction），这是从国际公约照搬过来的名堂，应该也是这种惩戒性损失，与复原大原则无关。反正在这种情况下，往往去依赖复原大原则去解释是不足够。在Merson v.Cartwright(2005)UKPC 38，英国枢密院的Scott勋爵是把这种惩罚性损失称为是“vindicatory damages”，说：
“If the case is one for an award of damages by way of constitutional redre… the nature of the damages awarded may be compensatory but should always be vindicatory and, accordingly, the damages may, in an appropriate case, exceed a purely compensatory amount.The purpose of a vindicatory award is not punitive purpose.It is not to teach the executive not to misbehave.The executive interference, mistreatment or oppreion… in some cases a suitable declaration may suffice to vindicate the right;in other cases an award of damages, including substantial damages, may seem to be neceary.”
在Merson v.Cartwright先例中，判是被告要赔偿原告100,000巴哈马元（相等于美元），而这一笔钱说是既不视为是赔偿性，但也不属于惩罚性。
2.7 核算惩罚性损失应去考虑的因素
惩罚性损失虽然是臆猜，但还是有了一些案例给了指引有关应该去考虑的因素。Devlin勋爵在Rookes v Barnard(1964)AC 1129先例就提到了三个必须要去考虑的因素，他们分别是：（1）必须是被告应该受到惩罚的侵权行为的真正受害人作为原告（the claimant to be the victim of the punishable behaviour）；（2）适度的赔偿（moderation in awards）；（3）当事人的财力（means of the parties）。还有一些其他考虑因素，以下去分段作出进一步的探讨。
2.7.1 考虑因素之一：真正受害人作为原告
看来，这一个考虑因素在现实中很少会适用，原因是侵权的诉因是不能转让，所以在侵权能够作为原告一定是受害人。唯一会是例外的是受害人在侵权的行为中死亡，变了是他的遗属作为原告。这已经有立法针对并在1934年的《Law Reform(Miscellaneous Provisions)Act》之Section 1(2)(a)有规定是遗属作为原告的索赔不能去包括惩罚性损失赔偿。这样的立法规定倒是带来了质疑，例如在《McGregor on Damages》（第十八版，2009年）一书11-034段。例如是警察把疑犯打伤就会面对惩罚性损失赔偿，但如果把疑犯打死就可以面对疑犯的遗属提出的索赔反而可去避免作出惩罚性损失赔偿，这有点说不通。2.7.2 考虑因素之二：适度的赔偿
在Rookes v Barnard(1964)AC 1129先例，Devlin勋爵看来是认为在过去先例中陪审团作出惩罚性损失赔偿的判决金额太高，说：“to amount to a greater punishment that would be likely to be incurred if the conduct were criminal;and, moreover, a punishment imposed without the safeguard which the criminal law gives to an offender.I should not allow the respect which is traditionally paid to an aement of damages by a jury to prevent me from seeing that the weapon is used with restraint.It may even be that the House may find it neceary to follow the precedent it set for itself in Benham v Gambling(1941)AC 157 and place some arbitrary limit on awards of damages that are made by way of punishment.Exhortations to be moderate may not be enough”。
在较近期的Thompson v Commiioner of Police of the Metropolis and Hsu v Commiioner of Police of the Metropolis(1998)QB 498 CA先例，案情涉及了“非法禁锢”（false imprisonment）与“恶意起诉”（malicious prosecution），上诉庭把陪审团估计的惩罚性损失在第一个先例中从200,000英镑减为15,000英镑，而第二个先例从50,000英镑减到25,000英镑。上诉庭的Woolf勋爵说：“Where exemplary damages are appropriate they are unlikely to be le than £5,000.Otherwise the case is probably not one which justifies an award of exemplary damages at all.In this cla of action the conduct must be particularly deserving of punishment for an award of as much as £25,000 to be justified and the figure of £50,000 should be regarded as the absolute maximum, involving directly officers of at least the rank of superintendent”。
2.7.3 考虑因素之三：当事人的财力
针对这一个考虑，当事人应该只是指被告。显然如果被告是非常富有，一个小金额的惩罚性损失赔偿跟本就起不来惩罚的作用。所以在Benson v Frederick(1766)3 Burr 1845和John v MGN(1997)QB 586 CA先例，是有说明被告的财力是一个考虑因素。
2.7.4 考虑因素之四：避免与刑事诉讼去作出重复的惩罚
已经提到过，为同样的罪名或理由去作出两次重复的刑罚，是违反基本的公正大原则。所以在这种情况下，不光是去作出适度的赔偿或是小金额的惩罚，而是应该在民事诉讼中去避免作出任何惩罚性损失赔偿。所以在Archer v.Brown(1985)Q.B.401先例，涉及了欺诈行为，但由于被告已经因为欺诈本身是刑事罪行而受到了起诉与定罪，并曾经被监禁，所以民事诉讼再去为同一行为作出惩罚有严重不妥之处。
这在近期的Devenish Nutrition Ltd v.Sanofi-Aventis SA(2008)2 WLR 637先例，也是有同样的考虑。
2.7.5 考虑因素之五：当事人的行为
这里所涉及的就是原告与被告的行为，例如原告是否曾经做一些事情去刺激了被告的侵权行为。这在Lane v Holloway(1968)1 QB 379 CA先例有提到过原告的“provocation would be relevant to the question of whether or not exemplary damages should be awarded, and, if so, how much”。另在Thompson v Commiioner of Police of the Metropolis and Hsu v Commiioner of Police of the Metropolis(1998)QB 498 CA先例，Woolf勋爵也有说是原告对被告（警察）的行为如果有不妥当，陪审团也应该去考虑是否去作出或减少惩罚性损失赔偿。
除了原告的行为外，被告的行为也是考虑因素。例如被告在审理的时候对作出道歉就会是减少惩罚性损失赔偿的考虑因素，但相反如果被告坚持自己的做法这会提高惩罚性损失赔偿：Loudon v Ryder(1953)2 QB 202 CA。
2.7.6 考虑因素之六：复原赔偿的金额
损失赔偿会是有两个部分，一个就是根据复原大原则的损失赔偿，另一个就是惩罚性损失。后者是永远不应该去影响前者金额的高低，因为根据复原大原则计算出来的损失应该是不会任意去增加或减少。但前者会影响后者金额的高低，因为后者惩罚性损失是一个不稳定的金额，可以去增加或减少。例如，法院认为根据复原大原则计算的损失已经很足够去惩罚被告，就会去减少甚至避免对被告作出惩罚性损失赔偿。相反，如果法院认为复原大原则下根本不足去教训被告，就会需要去提升惩罚性损失赔偿的金额。这方面可去节录《McGregor on Damages》（第十八版，2009年）一书11-041段所说如下：“While the aement of compensation can never be affected by the amount awarded by way of exemplary damages, the converse is not true.The size of an exemplary award may indeed be influenced by the size of the compensatory one, even to the extent of being eliminated.Lord Devlin in Rookes v Barnard indicated that, in a case where exemplary damages were appropriate, ‗a jury should be directed that if, but only if, the sum which they have in mind to award as compensation(which may, of course, be a sum aggravated by the way in which the defendant has behaved to the plaintiff)is inadequate to punish him for his outrageous conduct, to mark their disapproval of such conduct and to deter him from repeating it, then it can award some larger sum”。
2.7.7 考虑因素之七：多位被告
如果在一个侵权诉讼，有多位被告被一并起诉，就会有情况只有一位被告的侵权行为是可去作出惩罚性损失赔偿的判决。这一来去作出一个判决就不能去作出惩罚性损失赔偿，因为这会影响其他不应该被惩罚的被告：Clark v Newsam(1847)1 Ex.131;Broome v Caell & Co(1972)AC 1027。
2.7.8 考虑因素之八：多位原告
在AB v South West Water Services(1993)QB507 CA先例，案情涉及了被告的供水收到污染，饮用了这些吃水的受害人有接近200个人之众，他们作为多位与共同原告向被告提出起诉，要求惩罚性损失赔偿。上诉庭的Stuart Smith大法官认为有太多原告所以不适合去作出惩罚性损失赔偿，会带来困难是判多少金额与该笔钱怎么样在受害人的原告手中去分摊。同样的案例也在Devenish Nutrition Ltd v Sanofi-Aventis SA(2008)2 WLR 637先例，涉及了一个药厂把维他命药非法在全球提高价格。这带来了非法抬高价格的集体诉讼，这多位原告并要求惩罚性损失赔偿。但这被法院拒绝，认为多位原告并不是所有的人士受到抬高价格的影响，其中不少住在欧洲大陆，他们是没有这种救济。
2.8 合约下的惩罚性损失赔偿：英国法律地位
一般而言，英国法院是不准在合约纠纷作出任何惩罚性损失或加大损失（本章2.1.3段）赔偿的：Addis v.Gramophone Co Ltd(1909)AC 488;Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v.New Garage & Motor Co Ltd(1915)AC 79；Watts, Watts & Co.Ltd v.Mitsui & Co.Ltd(1917)AC 227；Paris Oldham & Gustra v.Staffordshire B.G.(1988)2 E.G.L.R.39；Reed v.Madon(1989)Ch.408；Jobson v.Johnson(1989)1 WLR 1026, CA等等。可能只有一种的例外是解除婚约。但与惩罚性损失赔偿有一点分不开的是一种“非金钱损失”（non-pecuniary loes）的精神痛苦（mental distre）、不适（discomfort）等去以金钱作出赔偿。对这在合约方面赔偿的认同，令英国合约法针对损失赔偿看来有扩大与开始容忍之迹象。这方面可以去节录Ewan Mckendrick教授在《Contract Law— Text, Cases and Materials》（2010年第四版）一书中918页所讲如下：
“The preure to recognize that a breach of contract can, in principle, give rise to a claim for punitive damages is building.The Supreme Court of Canada has now recognized that punitive damages may be awarded in respect of a breach of contract upon proof of an independent actionable wrong arising out of the same facts as the breach(see Royal Bank of Canada v.W Got & Aociates Electric Ltd(2000)178 DLR(4th)385 and Whiten v Pilot Insurance Co(2002)SCC 18 and, more generally, J Edelman, ‗Exemplary Damages for Breach of Contract‘(2001)117 LQR 539.)Will the English courts eventually reach this conclusion? They have not done so yet(Devenish Nutrition Ltd v.Sanofi-Aventis SA(2008)EWCA Civ 1086;(2009)3 WLR 198,(143)but it may be that in time they will.If torts and equitable wrongs can generate a claim for punitive damages, why should a breach of contract never give rise to such a claim? As Lord Nicholls stated in A v.Bottrill(2002)UKPC 44;in recognizing that punitive damages can, in principle, be recovered in a case where the wrong committed by the defendant was neither intentional nor reckle, ‗never say never is a sound judicial admonition‘.A refusal to recognize that a breach of contract can give rise to punitive damages will simply encourage claimants to characterize the beach as some other cause of action for the purpose of seeking punitive damages.This subterfuge will bring little credit to the law.The logic behind the abolition of the ‗cause of action‘ test will eventually bring down the rule that a breach of contract can never give rise to a claim for punitive damages.This leads us on to the second question.When will punitive damages be available in a breach of contract case? The answer, it is suggested, will be very rarely.There are eentially two reasons for this.The first is that, as both Lord Nicholls and Lord Scott pointed out in Kuddus the effect of Attorney-General v.Blake（1998）Ch 439 may well be to undermine Lord Devlin‘s second category in Rookes v Barnard(1964)AC 1129 on the basis that ‗the profit made by a wrongdoer can be extracted from him without the need to rely on…exemplary damages‘.This being the case, punitive damages are only likely to be available where the breach of contract by the defendant is ‗so outrageous, his disregard of the plaintiff‘s rights so contumelious, that something more is needed to show that the law will not tolerate such behaviour‘.Such cases are likely to be few and far between.In particular, the mere fact that the defendant has broken his contract with the claimant in order to pursue a more profitable relationship with another party will not suffice to entitle the claimant to punitive damages.Much more will be required before a finding is made that a defendant has behaved in an ‗outrageous‘ fashion.”
2.8.1什么是惩罚性损失赔偿条文
2.8.1.1 惩罚性损失赔偿条文是为了阻吓
惩罚性损失赔偿条文可以根据许多不同的形式出现，因为有订约自由。可以说去草拟一条没有任何惩罚性味道的条文去面对将来千变万化的情况也不是一件容易的事。所以，不断有新的案例出现。去在不同写法的条文去找出是否是无效的惩罚性条文，就是去通过条文的解释来看看在订约的时候，是否是为了去阻吓一方合约方不得去违约，否则会面对严重的惩罚性后果。这惩罚性后果可以是支付一笔庞大以及与估计的真正损失扯不上关系的金钱，或是要承担大幅度提高的对价，或是要面对更苛刻的条件，等。反正最后的目的是可以客观去视为是为了阻吓对方不得去违约。这方面可去节录Colman大法官在Lordsvale Finance plc v Bank of Zambia(1996)QB 752先例中说：“whether a provision is to be treated as a penalty is a matter of construction to be resolved by asking whether at the time the contract was entered into the predominant contractual function of the provision was to deter a party from breaking the contract or to compensate the innocent party for breach.That the contractual function is deterrent rather than compensatory can be deduced by comparing the amount that would be payable on breach with the lo that might be sustained if breach occurred”。
另一个著名的说法是Clarke大法官在Murray v.Leisurepaly(2005)EWCA Civ 963是去考虑议定赔偿金额与真正的损失相比是否是夸大的，不诚实与不是一个真正对损失的估计(extravagant, unconscionable and not a genuine pre-estimate of lo)。另Clarke大法官也提到了是去找出议定赔偿金额是否是“阻吓性或是赔偿性”（deterrent or compensation）。
2.8.1.2 不涉及金钱赔偿而是针对违约会带来更苛刻条件或更高昂对价也会是惩罚性条文
最常见的惩罚性损失赔偿条文是涉及了违约时去要求违约方支付一笔远超出预计的真正损失作为赔偿，或是允许无辜方去没收违约方所支付的金钱（例如是定金、押金），而该笔钱是远超出预计的真正损失。但已经有提到，会有情况是对违约方十分严厉的条文，即使是不涉及金钱，也会有危险被视为是惩罚性损失赔偿条文，但这就会涉及了非常复杂的分析与解释。随便在许多的案例中先挑一个，在Euro London Appointments Ltd v Claeens International Ltd(2006)2 Lloyd‘s Rep 436先例，涉及了的合约是员工中介公司与雇主的合约关系。中介公司是收取费用为雇主去寻找适合的员工，其中有条文针对找到的员工如果上班后不久就辞职，在这种情况下是有条文去说明中介公司必须退还部分的收费。合约中还另有第4.1条文说明这一个退还收费只是在雇主准时在中介公司作出发票的7天内支付，才有权去享受。该条文是这样说：“4.1 In order to qualify for the following refund, the Client must pay the Agency‘s fee within 7 days of the date of invoice and must notify the Agency in writing of the termination of the Engagement within 7 days of the its termination‖。
问题是，这一个根本不涉及金钱的条文是否是惩罚性损失赔偿条文？它显然是去针对雇主的违约，就是不准时支付费用。而条文约定的后果是与中介公司真正的损失很不一样并且会达到超出，因为不准时支付通常的损失只是利息。这导致了在该先例的第一审，被视为是一条“伪装”（disguised）惩罚性损失赔偿条文，所以是无效。但去了上诉庭被推翻，认为第4.1条文只是一条先决条件的条文，就是雇主希望享有退还收费的好处，就必须先去做到这一个先决条件。这与惩罚性损失赔偿是没有关系。上诉庭举例说是有关支付费用给中介公司的期限是在另一条文的第3.1(c)条文，要求是收到发票后的7天内。但这与第4.1条文没有必然的关系，所以在订约自由下，把第3.1(c)条文约定与写为14天是完全可以发生。这表示雇主如果没有按照第4.1条文去在发票作出后7天内支付，就会失去了退还收费的好处，但他还没有任何的违约，因为第3.1(c)条文是允许他有14天才去支付。这样去看，第4.1条文根本就不是针对违约，也表示不是惩罚性损失赔偿条文。在该先例，第3.1(c)与第4.1条文都写的是7天，但他们之间没有必然的关系，也可以有不同天数的规定，就显示了第4.1条文的有效性。
下一个先例是可去节录上诉庭的Mance 大法官在Cine Bes Filmcilik ve Yapimcilik v United International Pictures(2003)EWCA Civ 1669先例中提到Colman大法官所说的有关条文是去在对方违约的时候会大幅度提高对价也可以是惩罚性，说：“In the case before him, Colman J was concerned with a provision for prospective increase in the interest rate payable by a borrower, following the borrower‘s default.He said that, although the payment of liquidated damages is ‗the most prevalent purpose‘ for which an additional payment on breach might be required under a contract‖
‗… the jurisdiction in relation to penalty clauses is concerned not primarily with the enforcement of inoffensive liquidated damages clauses but rather with protection against the effect of penalty clauses.There would therefore seem to be no reason in principle why a contractual provision the effect of which was to increase the consideration payable under an executory contract upon the happening of a default should be struck down as a penalty if the increase could in the circumstances be explained as commercially justifiable, provided always that its dominant purpose was not to deter the other party from breach.‘”。
该先例是针对一种情况，就是在贷款合约中有条文针对贷款人如果违约，有条文说明他在接下去的贷款就要支付大幅度提高的利息作为对价。这种条文不针对违约要去支付一笔钱，但原则上还是可以被视为是惩罚性条文。
2.8.1.3 不为了阻吓合约对方违约的条文不属于惩罚性损失赔偿
不容易拟定与区分条文是否属于惩罚性损失赔偿而无效其中一个微妙的分别是它有否去针对违约时的赔偿或支付。如果不是，就不属于这一个类别，也不会无效。这方面可去介绍Alder v Moore(1961)2 QB 57 CA先例，案情涉及了一个球会为球员投保，其中条文涉及了保险人支付一位受伤并且不能再去专业踢球的球员赔付500英镑。案例中的被告是一位球员，踢球中眼睛受伤并被证明为残疾。他被支付了500英镑并签署了一份宣言说明以后再也不会去专业踢球，否则将支付保险人罚金500英镑。但在四个月后，被告重新去兼职专业踢球，这应该是违反了承诺。保险人向被告提出起诉要求去归还这500英镑，但被告以该承诺为惩罚性损失赔偿条文为抗拒的理由。法院判是这一个说法不适用，因为它不是针对去阻吓被告违约，退还这500英镑也与被告有否真正损失没有关系。
再接下去介绍Export Credits Guarantee Department v Universal Oil Products Co（1983）1 WLR 399 HL先例，案情涉及了被告为一家第三人的纽芬兰公司建造炼油厂，而建造涉及了一个银团的融资。银团的担保是由该纽芬兰公司作出的“期票”（promiory notes），并且由原告作出保证。而原告与被告的合约中有条文说明原告如果因为被告在建造合约中的违约导致了要在保证中作出任何的支付给银团，被告必须向原告作出补偿。事后发生违约，纽芬兰公司没有去在期票下向银团作出支付，这导致了原告需要去支付银团高达约4,000万英镑。原告事后向被告请求补偿，但被告的抗辩是指该有关条文是属于惩罚性而无效。但贵族院判是这不是属于惩罚性损失赔偿条文，因为它所针对的并非是原告与被告之间的违约，它所针对的是被告与第三人的纽芬兰公司之间的违约。
2.8.1.4 议定赔偿金额低过真正损失的估计不属于惩罚性损失赔偿条文
如果议定赔偿是低过真正损失的估计，就不存在有惩罚性条文的争议，这也是可作为一种责任限制的做法。在Widnes Foundry v.Cellulose Acetate(1931)2 KB 393先例中，案情涉及一个建造丙酮回收的工厂，双方约定是完工日期如果被延误，承建商就要每周赔偿20英镑。建造慢了30周，而承建商也在责任上被判是违约，但损失只限制在600英镑而不是原告真正与更大高达5,850英镑的损失。上诉庭的Scrutton大法官说：“I find great difficulty in saying that an estimate le than the actual lo can ever be a penalty in terrorem.”
所以在现实中，程租合约的谈判中经常会见到承租人大力去压低滞期费意图去减轻他将来违约的赔偿责任，但船东大力去提高，特别是面对航次中估计会遇上港口拥挤的情况。最后双方同意的滞期费金额则是要取决于双方谈判的力量、地位与知识水平等等。同样在造船合约下，将来要去作出支付议定赔偿的船厂应该在谈判的时候与程租合约下的承租人有同样的心态，要大力去争取减低延误交船每天的赔偿金额。而且，为了防止一些船厂不能控制的严重延误（这种延误也不一定可以去根据不可抗力事件条文而得到允许，从而去延后交船日期，因为这是要看该条文是否写得对船厂有利，够广泛），导致船厂要支付完全不能接受的巨额议定赔偿（比方说是船价的一半甚至是全部），通常还会去来一个“封顶”（cap），就是说明在延误的议定赔偿金额到了150万或者其他金额，或每天的议定赔偿累计到180日后，船厂就再也不必去赔偿。至于这严重延误下船东可否去中断造船合约，这是要看其他的条文怎样规定以及当时的船价市场，是另外一个问题。
约定金额较低的议定赔偿还会可以取巧，只要懂得灵活使用。笔者可以在此举一个实际发生了的例子，就是一家中国船厂与欧洲船东大约在2004年签订的造船合约中，船价为2,000万美元。由于船价不高，因为订约时的航运市场仍是低迷，所以延误交船的议定赔偿也只是约定在9,000美元一天，并且有一个150万美元总赔偿金额的封顶。接下来的两年内，航运市场大涨，到了临近交船日期之时，市场船价已经达到了5,000万美元。欧洲船东非常想准时甚至提早接收船舶投入营运，可去在高涨的市场大赚一笔。但中国船厂就因为钢材价格上涨所带来的造价上涨而会损失惨重。结果在笔者的建议下，船厂去准备延误交船（但绝不是拒绝交船，因为这是毁约，一被欧洲船东接受去终断合约，就会带来庞大与比较市场船舶价格的索赔），并向欧洲船东承诺一定愿意承担这9,000美元一天的议定赔偿，甚至是封顶的150万美元。字里行间给船东一个信号就是会延误交船很长一段时间，这带来了欧洲船东的恐慌，毕竟航运市场会好多久，事先是没人知道的。结果是很快就帮助中国船厂与欧洲船东达成协议，就是去把造船合约约定的船价提高至船厂满意的一个金额，船厂会尽快与准时交船给船东。笔者听说之后中国船厂有不少在用同样的技巧去迫使船东提高造船合约的价格，甚至知悉在中国法院也有类似的官司。
在这一个说法下，表示议定赔偿的金额也就是违约方唯一要支付的赔偿。但由于是不足去赔偿受害方真正蒙受的损失，所以经常会有争议是受害方试图去打破这一个偏低的议定赔偿。有关这一方面的问题，在笔者的《装卸时间与滞期费》一书之第18章有十分详尽的针对，请参阅。这方面也可去看贵族院的重要先例：Suie Atlantique Societe d‘Armement S.A.v.N.V.Rotterdamsche Kolen Centrale(1966)1 Lloyd‘s Rep.529。
2.8.1.5 惩罚性损失赔偿条文不影响受害方索赔真正蒙受的损失
去一提的是即使一条条文被视为是惩罚性而变了无效，也不是天塌下来。他的效果只是被视为是该条文从来不存在，受害方还是可以去向违约方索赔他真正的损失（金额会少一点），失去的只是惩罚性损失赔偿条文中比真正损失多出来的部分就再去不能去向违约方索赔。这方面可去先举Wall v Rederiaktiebolaget Luggude(1915)3 KB 66先例，其中Baihache大法官说：“This being the state of the law as I understand it, one easily sees why in charterparty cases no one sues on the penalty clause now.You cannot under it recover more than the proved damages, and if the proved damages exceed the penal sum you are restricted to the lower amount.As the penalty clause may be disregarded it always is disregarded and has become a dead letter, or from another point of view a ‗brutum fulmen‘ …”。
另在Campbell Discount Co Ltd v Bridge(1962)AC 600先例中有说：“… Although in practice a penalty clause in a contract as described above is effectively a dead letter, it is important in the present case to note that, contrary to the submiions of [counsel for the defendants], the strict legal position is not that such a clause is simply struck out of the contract, as though with a blue pencil, so that the contract takes effect as if it had never been included therein.Strictly, the legal position is that the clause remains in the contract and can be sued upon, but it will not be enforced by the court beyond the sum which represents, in the events which have happened, the actual lo of the party seeking payment …”
2.8.1.6 举证责任与其他考虑
举证责任是在声称议定赔偿属于惩罚性条文的一方，毕竟，法院通常是不会警觉例如是议定赔偿与惩罚性条文的分别：Robophone Facilities v.Blank(1966)1 WLR 1428。
另在Murray v Leisureplay plc(2005)EWCA Civ 963先例，案情涉及一个雇佣合同中的第17条规定，如果作为被告的公司没有向原告的雇员作出提前一年通知就解雇，被告就要赔偿原告一年的薪资总额。而被告在解雇原告时，只提前作出7.5个星期通知。根据该第17条文，被告的行为构成非法解雇，而原告有权获得一年的薪资总额。一审法院判是这个雇佣合同中的第17条是一个惩罚性条文而无效。而上诉庭驳回一审的判决。上诉庭认为要证明一个违约损失赔偿条文是惩罚性条文的举证责任是在声称该条文为惩罚性而免责的一方当事人，在本案毫无疑问要由被告举证。然而被告不能举证证明该第17条文不是对损失的合理预计，因为被告是在律师、财务顾问、董事等专业人士的同意下自愿与原告签署该合约，提前终断该雇佣合约对被告有潜在的好处而对原告也有潜在的损失，在商业环境中一年的解雇通知期也是合理的。因此被告不能证明第17条具有阻吓性而应被判为惩罚性条文。仅仅因为这一年薪资总额的赔偿超出原告的损失不能使该条文无效。上诉庭的Arden大法官说：“The burden of showing that a clause for the payment of damages on breach is a penalty clause is on the party who seeks to escape liability under it, not on the party who seeks to enforce it.I have already made the point that there is no direct evidence as to why the parties agreed to clause 17 rather than(say)a clause making some allowance for mitigation.As explained above, this iue has to be judged as at the date of the agreement.In this case, there is no question of MFC showing that clause 17 was imposed in terrorem ”。
其他针对惩罚性损失赔偿条文的考虑可去一提的是针对双方当事人都是有水平与有平等谈判力量所达成的协议，特别是商业合约，英国法院在许多重要的先例中都有去重复尽量不去干预。例如在Philips Hong Kong Ltd v Attorney General of Hong Kong(1993)61 BLR 41 PC先例中Woolf勋爵说：“Likewise the fact that two parties who should be well capable of protecting their respective commercial interests agreed the allegedly penal provision suggest that the formula for calculating liquidated damages is unlikely to be oppreive …”
此外，在Steria Ltd v.Sigma Wirele Communications Ltd.(2008)BLR 79先例也提到了去把一个双方都是有水平的人士去约定的商业合约中的有关条文判是惩罚性条文而无效，这是法院尽量要去避免的（in commercial contracts the courts should exercise great caution before striking down a clause as penal.）。
2.8.2 议定赔偿条文的好处 先去谈谈“议定赔偿”（liquidated damages）条文在很多商业合约中都会有，它也是最常见会涉及与惩罚性损失赔偿的争议。议定赔偿条文在很多的商业合约中都会出现，就是在订立合约时，合约双方就某一特定的违约/毁约约定违约方去向受害方做出的确定数额的赔偿。在造船合约中，它通常是去针对两种经常会发生的违约。
（一）是晚了约定交船的日期，这就会去约定每一天的延误要支付多少固定赔偿。
（二）是针对船厂对所造船舶的一些主要规范说明达不到约定的标准，比如是船速，耗油量，载重量，船舱容积等。这种约定会是如船速慢了半节，船价要扣减5%。与造船合约本质相同的工程合约，也是对晚了去完成工程要去约定每一天延误要支付的固定赔偿。
在造船合约（或工程合约），交船延误如果是根据船东真正损失，就会对船厂带来相当大的不稳定。有可能在交船的时候，航运市场低迷，加上船东还没有找到下一个租约，反正准时接收了船舶也是要去抛老锚或待命，就表示船厂的延误交船也没有对船东造成任何真正的损失。但也会是另一个极端，就是交船的时候航运市场高涨，早日交船可以替船东带来很大的利润。这延误损失计算起来就难免有争议与昂贵的诉讼，好像贵族院的The ―Achilleas‖(2007)2 Lloyd‘s Rep 555先例。
本来在普通法，受害方可去向违约方索赔损失是默示的地位，根本不必去说明。但怎样去计算或是证明真正损失在有一些违约是十分不容易，而且经常会导致昂贵的诉讼。这种真正的损失说不准是多少，大原则是只要违约引起的损失类别不是在订约的时候不可以合理预见：Hadley v Baxendale(1854)9 Exch 341，违约与造成损失类别之间的“因果关系”（causation）没有中断，都可以计算在内，谋求将受害人复原到一个合约没有被违反的地位，这也是所谓的“复原大原则”（compensatory principle）。所以，真正损失计算可被称为是“非议定赔偿”（unliquidated damage）。
一般在违约中，针对一些计算真正损失不容易与经常发生昂贵的争议与诉讼。所以在经常会发生的违约类别，订约双方就会为了省事，先去约定议定赔偿。这样将来就算出了争议也可以局限在责任方面的而不必在真正损失计算与证明方面加添麻烦。反之，针对一些不经常会发生的违约，甚至加上了计算损失相对容易的因素，就不存在要在订约的时候去约定议定赔偿了，毕竟这也涉及了需要的延长谈判的额外工作。
以程租合约（voyage charter）或国际货物买卖合约为例，议定赔偿的做法就是“滞期费”（demurrage），因为承租人或非派船方（CIF的买方或FOB的卖方）超出了固定的装卸时间导致违约是经常会发生的事情。但程租合约其他的违约，例如船东晚了交船或疏忽造成货损货差，或是承租人短装了货物，等，就会以个别不同的违约去计算与证明真正损失。毕竟在这种千变万化的违约下，订约的时候即使估计会发生也难以估计违约程度的严重性，难以去预先约定一笔议定赔偿。
去总结，在合约中去约定议定赔偿的好处有以下几种：
（一）它可以很大程度上减少计算与证明真正损失的麻烦与费用，特别是一些非常复杂、困难与经常发生的违约：Clydebank Engineering & Shipbuilding Co.v.Don Jose Yzquierdo y Castaneda(1905)AC 6(HL)；Philips Hong Kong v.Attorney General of Hong Kong(1993)61 BLR 41, PC。
（二）它可以让违约方知道如果发生违约事件，他面对的赔偿责任是多少，甚至可以去对某一些风险作出投保。在Widnes Foundry v Cellulose Acetate(1931)2 KB 393, CA中，Scrutton大法官说：“In many cases a man before entering in contract wishes to know for what he is to be liable if he breaks it, and he agrees a sum payable by him in that event.That obviously has nothing to do with figures fixed in terrorem.”
（三）在一定程度上，议定赔偿还可以去作为一种责任限制，这在本章2.8.1.4段已经有提到。
2.8.3 议定赔偿条文是否惩罚性损失赔偿条文？
议定赔偿虽然有以上所讲的好处，但仍会面对各种抗辩或争议，而最主要与常见的抗辩就是争议它是一条惩罚性条文因而无效，损失要以真正损失计算与证明。一种经常会出现情况，就是要赔偿的一方声称议定赔偿定得太高，属于惩罚性条文，法律不应该去承认或执行：Watts, Watts & Co.Ltd v.Mitsui & Co.Ltd(1917)AC 227；Jobson v.Johnson(1989)1 WLR 1026, CA。
会造成这种情况就是在订约的时候，双方所约定的议定赔偿金额并非是一个真正损失的估计。更明显的是，有证据显示一方为了去威胁另一方不敢去违约，而逼另一方接受天文数字的议定赔偿，该数字是大大超出真正损失的估计。在这方面权威的说法是贵族院的Scandinavian Trading v.Flota Ecuatoriana(1983)2 AC 694中Diplock勋爵所说的：
“The claic form of penalty clause is one which provides that upon breach of a primary obligation under the contract a secondary obligation shall arise on the part of the party in breach which does not represent a genuine pre-estimate of any lo likely to be sustained by him as the result of the breach of primary obligation but is substantially in exce of that sum.”
这方面的争议有大量的先例，如：Re Newman(1876)4 Ch.D.724, CA；Public Works Commiioner v.Hills(1906)AC 368, PC； Euro London Appointments Ltd v.Claeens International Ltd(2006)2 Lloyd‘s Rep 436；M & J Polymers Ltd v.Imerys Minerals Ltd(2008)1 Lloyd‘s Rep 541 等等。
2.8.4 怎样去区分合约的一般议定赔偿条文与惩罚性条文
至于它们之间怎样去区分，一些大原则有在著名的贵族院先例Dunlop Ltd.v.New Garage Co.Ltd.(1915)AC 79中有涉及。该著名先例的案情是著名的轮胎公司Dunlop与分销商订立的合约，其中规定了分销商不得以低于某一价格出售轮胎，以免造成内部竞争，而其中有第5条文说明如果有违反，分销商就必须为每一个低价出售的轮胎支付一笔钱（名义上称为议定赔偿），条文是如下：“We(that is the respondents)agree to pay to the Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd, the sum of X for each and every tyre, cover or tube sold or offered in breach of this agreement, as and by way of liquidated damages and not as penalty, but without prejudice to any other rights or remedies you or the Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd, may have hereunder”。之后发生了分销商的违约，这就导致了双方之间的诉讼，而分销商作为被告的抗辩是指第5条文属于惩罚性条文。从不同法院的判法也可以看到这是不容易掌握的：一审的法院判第5条文是有法律效力的议定赔偿条文，但上诉庭改判是一条惩罚性条文，最后在贵族院又被改为是议定赔偿条文。
在贵族院，Dunedin勋爵有说明如何去区分议定赔偿与惩罚性损失赔偿条文，以下可去作其中的一些介绍：
2.8.4.1 区分原则之一：条文的标题并不重要
Though the parties to a contract who use the words ―penalty‖ or ―liquidated damages‖ may prima facie be supposed to mean what they say, yet the expreion used is not conclusive.The court must find out whether the payment stipulated is in truth a penalty or liquidated damages …
这里也体现了英国法一贯的精神，也就是重视实质内容而非标题，这与我们中国人重视标题或名堂有所不同。在英国法下一条条文可以写作是“议定损失赔偿条文”，但实质内容却是一条惩罚性条文：Re Newman(1876)4 Ch.D.724, CA；Public Works Commiioner v.Hills(1906)AC 368, PC。反之，也可能是一条条文写作“惩罚性条文”，但被判为仅仅是对违约损失合理估计的“议定损失赔偿条文”：Ranger v.G.W.Railway(1854)5 HLC 72, HL；Crux v.Aldred(1866)14 WR 656；Re White(1901)17 TLR 461, DC；Clydebank, etc., Co.v.Yzquierdo, etc.(1905)AC 6, HL。
2.8.4.2 区分原则之二：约定的金额比真正损失大为去威吓一方当事人不敢去违约
The eence of a penalty is payment of money(or other non-monetary rights)stipulated as in terroem of the offending party;the eence of liquidated damages is a genuine convenanted pre-estimate of damage.这一个大原则已经解释过，不必再去重复。只去多提一句就是作为惩罚性条文而导致不被法律所承认，主要就是金钱上大大超出订约时估计的真正损失，毕竟商业合约都是针对金钱。但如果是那些非金钱的约定，有这种惩罚的味道的话，也会有同样的后果。例如在Jobson v.Johnson(1989)1 WLR 1026，涉及了违约要去把财产转让作为惩罚。但这种情况千变万化，有时候法院也要现实。例如贷款合约经常就会涉及了一条条文是如果贷款人违约，借款人或银行会有什么合约上的救济。而这违约的定义可以是很广泛的，例如贷款人晚了去定期还款，但也可以是许多其他方面。例如是贷款合约中针对贷款人哪些行为属于违约，例如违犯一些规定，或是被其他债权人在法院申请要将其清盘，又或是对船舶作为抵押品作出伤害（例如不去进行维修保养，这会导致抵押品的价值下降，或者不投保）等等。这方面可以看在一般船舶贷款合约内的“保证契约”内的多种违约事件，这在笔者的《船舶融资与抵押》一书第五章4.2.1段有详细介绍。这时作为融资的银行其中的一个权力就可以马上把所有的贷款全部要求归还。这种所谓的“加速还款条文”（accelerated payment）也曾经被贷款方指称为惩罚性条文。
在The ―Angelic Star‖(1988)1 Lloyd‘s Rep.122，涉及船厂对船东作出的贷款，这些情况在今天好像是不可思议，但在70、80年代是非常普遍的现象。因为航运低迷而造成造船业非常不景气，而一些造船国家不论是一些老牌的西方国家或是一些新兴的造船国家，例如是韩国、日本或巴西面对激烈的竞争下都去对自己国家的造船业作出庞大的经济援助。它们各有各的理由，包括保护造船工业对国防很重要，或是保护劳工市场，又或是带起自己国家其他的工业，等等。The ―Angelic Star‖先例就是一个典型的例子，就是船东只需要支付船价的20%就可以接船去航运市场营运，而余下的80%就在接船后分8年，每半年共16期来摊还，其中摊还的利率也是固定的。显然，没有国家的资助，船厂是无法承担这种做法的，因为造船期间船厂是需要大量的资金。这样一来，造船合约就好像船舶融资合约一样，需要各种担保，例如要船东作出个人的担保或是集团公司作出担保，对船舶要去登记抵押权，等等。其中亦包括一条针对船东违约的情况下的“加速还款条文”。在该The ―Angelic Star‖先例，该条文是如下：
“13.The loan together with all other monies due to the Lenders by the Owners shall immediately become payable and the Lender shall forthwith be put in funds to cover all existing and future liability under any outstanding bills drawn in connection with the loan, and the security for the loan and such monies shall become enforceable … if …(a)The Owners fail to make payments of capital or interest … on due dates.”
由于船东违约，船厂向船东本人（作为担保人）提出诉讼，船东作出的抗辩就是说上述条文是惩罚性条文，但这不被法院接受，上诉庭的Donaldson大法官这样说： “Whatever the merits or demerits of this argument viewed as a whole, it depends upon the proposition that loan condition 13 is penalty clause.This I do not accept.Clearly a clause which provided that in the event of any breach of contract a long term loan would immediately become repayable and that interest thereon for the full term would not only be still payable but would be payable at once would constitute a penalty as being ‗a payment of money stipulated as in terrorem of the offending party‘(proposition 2 in the speech of Lord Dunedin in Dunlop Ltd.v.New Garage Co.Ltd.(1915)AC 79.)But I do not so read condition 13.‗The loan‘ is the capital sum.‗All other monies due to the lenders by the owners‘ cannot be construed as ‗all other monies which would otherwise become due by the owners in the future.‘ It means ‗all other monies due at the time of the happening of an event of default‘.The mere fact that the capital sum becomes immediately repayable upon a failure to comply with the conditions upon which credit was extended cannot constitute a penalty.The provision that the lenders shall forthwith be put under any outstanding bills drawn in connection with the loan is intended to safeguard the shipbuilders against their potential liability as drawers should the bills have been negotiated and the purchaser, as acceptor, fails to honour the bills upon maturity.This again is not a penalty provision.”
在笔者看来，英国法院的这种现实的做法与长远的考虑，建立起一套对银行与金融机构非常有利的法律环境，从而给自己带来了很大的经济利益。就拿上述例子来说，如果这样的“加速还款条文”被判为是惩罚性条文的话，除了这一期未支付的款项，很有可能是银行再也无法向贷款人拿到剩余但未到期的款项。因为贷款人可能面对清盘，而其届时对银行的违约责任仅限于当时到期未付的一期款项。而有了这“加速还款条文”，就可以因为贷款人违约而令到全部剩余的款项一并到期需要支付，而贷款人不支付就导致了对这些所有剩余款项的违约，从而给了银行理由与诉因来追讨这些款项，趁手中还有担保的时候一次过把欠款全数取回来。
2.8.4.3 区分原则之三：判断是否惩罚性条文是去看订约一刻的情况
The question whether a sum stipulated is penalty or liquidated damages is a question of construction to be decided upon the terms and inherent circumstances of each particular contract, judged of as at the time of the making of the contract, not as at the time of the breach.这方面也已经说过，一条条文是属于议定赔偿还是惩罚性条文，是要看在订约时候其是否是对将来会发生的违约损失的合理估计，而不是在真正违约时候去看是否合理。因为到了真正违约时，可能已经是订了合约的几年后，市场可能已经发生了很大的变化，导致赔偿议定损失的金额相比当时的市场看来是太高与太不合理。这里可以去节录Dunlop Ltd.v.New Garage Co.Ltd.(1915)AC 79中，Dunedin勋爵所说：
“The question whether a sum stipulated is penalty or liquidated damages is a question of construction to be decided upon the terms and the inherent circumstances of each particular contract, judged of as at the time of making of the contract, not as at the time of the breach.”
当然发生了违约去事后诸葛亮看看是否在订约时是一个对真正损失合理的估计也不是说完全没有作用。因为在一些违约，导致复杂的真正损失类别，就可以出了事才回头去看订约的时候这种损失类别是否可以合理预见，会否是在考虑之中，从而得出议定赔偿是否有惩罚性的味道。这在Philips Hong Kong v.Attorney-General of Hong Kong(1993)61 BLR 41中所讲的：
“The fact that the iue has to be determined objectively, judged at the date the contract was made, does not mean what happens subsequently is irrelevant.On the contrary it can provide valuable evidence as to what could reasonably be expected to be the lo at the time the contract was made …”
通常去挑出会可能有其中一种情况是议定损失会比真正损失高是并不足够，除非有其他客观的因素例如是强势的订约一方逼弱势方非要接受该议定赔偿条文。这也是在Philips Hong Kong v.Attorney-General of Hong Kong一案所说的：
“Except poibly in the case of situation where one of the parties to the contract is able to dominate the other as to the choice of the terms of a contract, it will normally be insufficient to establish that a provision is objectionably penal to identify situations where the application of the provision could result in a large sum being recovered by the injured party than his actual lo.”
2.8.4.4 区分原则之四：其他帮助区分的考虑
2.8.4.4.1 将来可能发生的违约最大的损失也低于约定的金额
It will be held to be a penalty if the sum stipulated for is extravagant and unconscionable in amount in comparison with the greatest lo that could conceivably be proved to have followed from the breach.这里是介绍一些大原则去考验哪些情况属于惩罚性条文，而其中第一个考验也是最重要的，就是议定赔偿的金额是非常夸大与过度的。这里又可以去举Clydebank Engineering & Shipbuilding Co.v Don Jose Yzquierdo y Castaneda(1905)AC 6(HL)的先例，Halsbury勋爵曾经举例说双方约定以50英镑造房子，1年内完工，如果做不到就要支付100万英镑作为惩罚，这就是明显的惩罚性条文。他说：
“if you agreed to build a house in a year, and agreed that if you did not build the house for £50, you were to pay a million of money as a penalty, the extravagance of that would become at once apparent.Between such an extreme case as I have supposed and other cases, a great deal must depend on the nature of the transaction—the thing to be done, the lo likely to accrue to the person who is endeavouring to enforce the performance of the contract, and so forth.”
上述是一个极端的例子，很容易可以看到是惩罚性条文，但遇上比较模棱两可的例子就不是这么容易掌握，而且判法也不会稳定。在上述的例子也要说明是合约的标的或对价与议定赔偿的金额也不是有必然的关系。甚至是没有关系，因为对价会只是名义上的，例如是一块钱，但这种合约如果双方去作出承诺并约定在违约的时候要作出议定赔偿，这是完全不会受只有一块钱对价的影响。又例如，一个收费十分廉宜的工程去建造一个展览场地，而且时间上非常急迫，如果不能准时完工就会带来很大的真正损失。这一来，双方针对工程延误约定了一个高昂的议定赔偿，而相对工程的费用并不高。结果因为工程延误了一段很短的时间，议定赔偿超出了工程的费用，但这并不表示这议定赔偿是一条惩罚性条文。
2.8.4.4.2 对纯金钱债务约定比债务更高的赔偿金额
It will be held to be a penalty if the breach consists only in not paying a sum of money, and the sum stipulated is a sum greater than the sum which ought to have been paid.这是另一个考验有关议定赔偿是否惩罚性条文，它是去针对一种违约就是晚了支付一笔钱。认为这种条文无效是因为这种违约的真正损失是完全知道，就是该付的这笔钱。所以再去约定另一个金额更高的议定赔偿就很明显是惩罚性条文了。
另一方面，银行为了避免贷款人延迟还钱，可以与贷款人在合约中约定迟付款的利息为伦敦同业拆放利率（London Interbank Offered Rate或简称LIBOR）或最优惠利率（prime rate）+3%（为例），这种条文不能说是惩罚性条文。虽然它比一般仲裁或者法院判的利率为高（一般是prime+1%），毕竟，每个人的融资成本或机会成本都不一样，以较高利息向银行、母公司或者是其他第三者借贷的情况经常发生，但是到了一个程度是如果该约定的利息百分比订得太高的话就会变成是惩罚性条文，当然分水线并不是那么容易掌握。一个明显的例子是有传言说香港甘泉航空公司在2008年4月发生经济困难与在清盘之前曾向一位香港首富借贷，其中规定要支付的利息高达40%，这就几乎肯定是惩罚性条文了。较近期有关高利息的案例有Jeancharm Ltd v Barnet Football Club Ltd(2003)EWCA Civ 58, 92 Con LR 26，它涉及了一个球会与供应商的合约中有关前者晚了支付要去赔偿利息每周5%，这等于年利率的260%。在后来的诉讼中，球会抗辩说这么高的利率是惩罚性。供应商的回应是应该去看整个合约，包括他要承担的风险与其他条文针对晚了供应要作出高额的赔偿。但上诉庭不认为这是改变了针对议定赔偿是否是惩罚性的基本看法，就是这议定赔偿金额是否是一个对将来的损失真正的估计，而260%显然不会是，所以有关的高利息条文无效。
2.8.4.4.3 对于大小及严重程度不一的多种违约约定一个单一的赔偿金额
There is a presumption(but no more)that it is penalty when ―a single lump sum is made payable by way of compensation, on the occurrence of one or more or all of several events, some of which may occasion serious and others but trifling damage.‖（Lord Elphinstone v.Monkland Iron and Coal Co.[1886] 11 App.Cas 332, HL）
举一个例子是，在一个建造合约中，除了约定一般的延误一星期要赔偿的一笔金额外，还有一条文规定如果该承包商不能按时履行所有的合约规定项目的话就要给雇主一笔议定赔偿金额的10,000英镑，这后面的规定被判是一条惩罚性条文：Re Newman, ex p.Capper(1876)4 Ch.D 724；Cooden Engineering Co.Ltd v Stanford(1953)1 QB 86, CA。这等于在该条文下不能按时履行的合约规定项目即使只是一粒螺丝，承包商也要赔偿雇主10,000英镑。换言之，不能按时履行的所有项目会是有很多，有大有小，都去要承包商在许多小的项目支付10,000英镑就会是惩罚性了。加上，大小事项，不论严重与否，都去约定要违约的承包商赔偿10,000英镑，本身就显示了双方没有在订约时去估计或者想过不同事项下的违约会带来的真正损失。所以，就有了假设这种条文本质上是惩罚性的。此外，如果同一个建造合约其条文约定为当承包商不能在约定的日子前履行合约，要支付雇主200英镑加上延误一星期要支付5英镑，这被判是议定赔偿条文，因为这些金额是基于同一件事情（就是工程延误）而支付的：Law v Redditch Local Board(1892)1 QB 127, CA；Pye v British Automobile Commercial Syndicate(1906)1 KB.425；Robophone Facilities Ltd v Blank(1966)1 WLR 1428, CA。
这里也可以去举一个造船合约的上诉庭先例Cenargo Ltd v Empresa Nacional Bazan de Construcciones Navales Militares SA(2002)EWCA Civ 524，案情部分是关系到一个船厂（Astilleros）的保证就是该建造的滚装渡轮可容纳146辆长13米的拖车，但所交的船舶由于甲板内的局限导致船东（Cenargo）声称少了6辆拖车的空间。该造船合约针对这一个船厂的担保如果受到破坏有一条文去针对就是每一辆拖车空间的减少要去支付150,000美元。该条文是如下：
“If the actual trailer carrying capacity of the Veel is le than 146 Units of 13 metres each the Builder shall pay to the Buyer as liquidated damages One hundred and fifty thousand United States Dollars($150,000)for each trailer unit by which the Veel is deficient but excluding the first one(1)in respect of which deficiency no liquidated damages shall be payable.If the deficiency in trailer carrying capacity is ten(10)or more the Buyer as an alternative to receiving the aforementioned liquidated damages may rescind the Contract.”
问题出在针对这6个减少了的拖车空间，可以很容易去作出一些调整就可以解决问题，例如去搬走备用螺旋桨的桨翼与在龙骨上作结构上的调整等。反正是双方专家估计的调整费用由欧洲船厂进行也只不过是11,000美元，但如果允许船东去向船厂根据造船合约索赔议定赔偿，6个拖车空间乘150,000美元就变成是900,000美元了。这里就带来争议就是议定赔偿能否用在一些很轻微的违约还是只能用于较为严重或者是不能补救的违约。或会问，如果是这么廉宜就可以作出调整的话船厂为什么不自己作出？这里可以有几种情况，一个是船厂自己不小心错失了这个机会；另一种情况可以是去作出调整需要时间，而交船的“死亡日期”（drop dead date）已经届临导致船厂要硬着头皮马上交船。在该先例，更是又一个原因，就是在造船合约约定了的拖车空间数目，这是与其他船舶的特征不一样，例如是船速与耗油不符合造船合约规定。这些都可以在交船前的试航时被确定下来，如果船厂花很少金钱就可以把一些找到的缺陷解决，船厂肯定会这样做。顶多解决问题后再来一次试航才去交船。但在本案例，涉及了装运拖车的空间，这一个船舶特征不存在有试航，所以有了数目不足的情况会是很容易去看漏。这导致船东在事后经营船舶的时候才会发觉这6个减少了的拖车空间。而被发觉后，船东认为他可以向船厂要求支付一大笔的议定赔偿。
船厂其中一个争议是议定赔偿是要在最后一期船价的支付中扣减，所以在接船以后就不再适用。这抗辩看来不被接受，另主要的争议就是议定赔偿是否适用。
在该先例中，上诉庭推翻了高院的判决，认为该造船合约的议定赔偿条文只是针对重大的违约（违反船厂担保），因为双方在订约时的意图应该是这样想的，而没有想到去适用在一些轻微与容易补救的违约。否则，这条文在大小违约都可以适用同一笔议定赔偿就会变成是一条惩罚性条文而无效。Longmore大法官是这样说：
“27 If there was a breach of art.1.4, I would, for my part, conclude that the true lo of the buyers cannot have been intended to be covered by the liquidated damages clause.There is a danger that, if a liquidated damages clause is held to apply to trifling breaches of contract or breaches of contract which result in a trifling lo, the whole clause might be struck down as a penalty clause.In the court below Mr.Kendrick（船厂代表大律师）did indeed make that submiion in relation to art.III.5, but he did not wish to repeat that submiion to this court;that was, no doubt, because liquidated damages clauses of the kind used in the present case have a genuinely useful function in pre-estimating damage which is likely to result.But it is important that such contracts should be construed, if poible, to avoid the result that breaches of contract resulting in minor loes will be covered by such clauses.As Lord Woolf said in Philips Hong Kong Ltd v Attorney General of Hong Kong(1993)61 BLR 41 at p.59:
'So long as the sum payable in the event of non-compliance with a contract is not extravagant, having regard to the range of loes that it could be reasonably anticipated it [the relevant clause] would have to cover at the time the contract was made, it can still be a genuine pre-estimate of the lo that would be suffered and so a perfectly valid liquidated damage provision.' That shows that it is important to have in mind the range of loes the parties would anticipate the clause would cover when they made their contract.I do not consider that the parties in this case, when agreeing liquidated damages in relation to trailer carrying capacity, could have had in mind defects in design or workmanship which could be rectified without incurring major expense, even if it could be said that until such defects were rectified the veel's spaces were, in breach of contract, not fully available.This approach to construction of a liquidated damages clause is similar to that of the Privy Council in Webster v Bosanquet [1912] AC 394, where it was held that a potentially penal clause did not apply to every sale contrary to a right of pre-emption clause(for breach of which liquidated damages were agreed to be payable)but only to sales in the sort of commercial quantity which the parties must have had in mind when they made their contract.Mr.Kendrick（船厂代表大律师）relied on a paage in Profeor Sir Guenther Treitel's book on the Law of Contract(10th edn, 1999), at p.932 as follows:
'A sum may, therefore, be regarded as penal if it might have become due on a trifling breach, even though the breach which actually occurred was quite a serious one, and one for which the sum could be regarded as a genuine pre-estimate.In this way, the rule can invalidate perfectly fair bargains.The courts will do their best to avoid such results by construing the contract so as to make the sum payable only on major breaches, for which it is a valid pre-estimate.'
For this proposition Webster v Bosanquet is cited.Mr.Eder（船东代表大律师）attacked the paage, firstly, as not justified by Webster v Bosanquet and, secondly, as being difficult to justify in principle since a distinction between major breaches and minor breaches of contract would give rise to uncertainty and unneceary argument.32 For my part, I think the paage correctly states the law, for the reasons that I have given, so long as one understands the phrase 'major breaches' as referring to breaches of contract giving rise to substantial lo of the kind contemplated by the liquidated damages clause.33 For these reasons I would hold that, even if there was a breach of art.1.4 of the contract to the extent of an inability on the part of the veel to provide six required slots, the lo resulting from that breach was not intended to be covered by the liquidated damages clause.I would therefore allow the builders' appeal by setting aside the judgment ….”
2.8.4.4.4 真正损失很难估计的情况
It is no obstacle to the sum stipulated being a genuine pre-estimate of damage, that the consequences of the breach are such as to make precise pre-estimation almost an impoibility.On the contrary, that is just the situation when it is probable that pre-estimated damage was the true bargain between the parties.如果一种违约是明显会导致很大程度的损失而真正损失是多少却很难预先估计的情况下，就存在一个假设是议定赔偿条文不是惩罚性条文：Philips Hong Kong v.Attorney General of Hong Kong(1993)61 BLR 41, PC。
在Dunlop Ltd.v.New Garage Co.Ltd.(1915)AC 79这一贵族院先例中，主要也是这一原因被贵族院认为是可以接受的议定赔偿条文，它涉及了Dunlop轮胎公司为了去保持价格稳定，避免分销商内部竞争，所以在分销合约中加入了这一条文。即使没有这一稳定价格的做法会带来的整体损失是可以计算出来的，但个别分销商的违约会带来什么样的损失是无法计算出来的。所以订下一个金额作为估计赔偿并无不合理之处，除非该金额是高到完全不合理的数额。Dunedin勋爵是这样说：
“Turning now to the facts of the case, it is evident that the damage apprehended by the appellants owing to the breaking of the agreement was an indirect and not a direct damage.So long as they got their price from the respondents for each article sold, it could not matter to them directly what the respondents did with it.Indirectly it did.Accordingly, the agreement is headed ‗Price Maintenance Agreement‘, and the way in which the appellants would be damaged if prices were cut is clearly explained in evidence by Mr.Baisley(the appellants‘ manager), and succeful attempt is made to controvert that evidence.But though damage as a whole from such a practice would be certain, yet damage from any one sale would be impoible to forecast.It is just, therefore, one of those cases where it seems quite reasonable for parties to contract that they should estimate that damage at a certain figure, and provided that figure is not extravagant there would seem no reason to suspect that it is not truly a bargain to ae damages, but rather a penalty to be held in terrorem.”
2.8.4.4.5 一连串合约中的中间方（party in between）
在一连串的合约，如果对一位夹在中间的合约方而言，前后合约如果都有约定不同议定赔偿的金额去针对某一些违约（例如是前后租约下不同的滞期费率），这会导致中间方会在有些情况下可以赚取一些差价。例如是中间方与原船东的租约约定滞期费是25,000美元一天，但去转租给分承租人是35,000美元一天。但显然在同样的违约下（超出装卸时间），中间方的损失只是需要支付给原船东25,000美元一天，变了他可去赚10,000美元一天的差价。问题是分承租人能否争辩这是惩罚性条文？笔者认为是不可以，因为中间方去赚取差价也不表示这35,000美元一天的滞期费条文是去阻吓分承租人别去违约把船舶延误，再说两个租约去订立的时间不一样，市场也不一样，谈判手段与强弱也不一样，不可能是要求滞期费金额都要一致或是十分接近才不算是惩罚性条文。
在Steria Ltd v.Sigma Wirele Communications Ltd.(2008)BLR 79先例也有同样的争议。该先例的总承包商Sigma与雇主的主合约内有一条针对整个工程完工日期延误的议定赔偿条文。Sigma把有关的电脑工程去给了分包商Steria。在分包合约中，也有一条议定赔偿条文，但条文内容与主合约中的条文内容不同，因为它分别针对了四个不同工程的延误。这一来，就会造成在分包合约出现了延误，但整个工程完工日期是没有受到延误的情况，就会导致Sigma根本没有损失也可以去向分包商Steria收取议定赔偿。所以该条文被分包商指称在本质上是惩罚性条文。但Stephen Davies大法官不同意，说：
“In such circumstances, in my judgment:(i)there is no substantial discrepancy between the liquidated damages provision of the subcontract and the level of damages likely to be suffered by Sigma;(ii)on the facts of this case I am unable to conclude that the clause was – objectively considered as at the date the contract was entered into – intended to be deterrent rather than compensatory.Overall, this being a commercial contract entered into between two substantial and experienced companies with knowledge of the difficulties which can occur where after the event one party seeks to recover general damages from the other for delay, I am not prepared to strike down the clause as penal.”
2.8.4.4.6 针对同一种违约有不同金额的议定赔偿
会有情况是去针对同一个违约有不同金额的议定赔偿，这包括在造船合约。例如在著名的Pacific Ocean Shipping Corp v.Sembawang Corp Ltd(No.1)(1998)Commercial Court 4 June 1998，该造船/改装合约针对工程的延误有以下的条文去针对：
“33.4 If the BUILDER should fail to deliver the VESSEL by the DELIVERY DATE or any extension thereof granted in accordance with the CONTRACT, the BUILDER shall pay LIQUIDATED DAMAGES to the OWNERS for such default at the rates shown below … … first four weeks 70,000 Singapore dollars per week;next four weeks 140,000 Singapore dollars per week.For any delay in exce of the first eight weeks 200,000 Singapore dollars a week.Delay for the purposes of this article shall mean the period which may elapse between the DELIVERY DATE and the actual date of the DELIVERY of the VESSEL.33.5 The rates of LIQUIDATED DAMAGES to which the BUILDER may become liable represent a genuine pre-estimate of the lo which the OWNERS would sustain in the event of delay and is not to be construed as a penalty.”
在该先例没有去争论这是否惩罚性损失赔偿的条文，但完全可以理解。因为很容易解释过去就是随着工程的延误加剧，后果会更严重，也代表损失会是更大。毕竟，该合约中有一条文说明工程的“时间是条件条文”（time is of the eence of the contract）
2.9 订金（deposit）与预付（pre-payment）
在许多商业合约中，经常会有订金的规定，目的主要是为了担保合约的履行。订金有另一种看来是非常接近的做法，可称为“部分预付”（part payment或pre-payment）。部分预付也是有同样的目的，加上可能有其他的目的，例如在一些涉及了机器的买卖合约中要求买方作出部分预付，就为了是去资助机器的制造。订金与部分预付最大的分别就是在支付方没有履行合约的情况下，订金会被“没收”（forfeit）。但部分预付的法律地位还未完全明确，但通常就要退还给支付方。例如是在合约明确收款人是要产生一些因为依赖该合约而花费的钱时，这就有可能被视为是订约意图，特别是针对收款人而言，是在对方没有履行合约时可以没收：Hyundai Shipbuilding and Heavy Industries Ltd v.Papadopoulos(1980)1 WLR 1129。这一来，就可以看到订金是会涉及到惩罚性条文的问题的，但部分预付就通常不会有。
在订约自由下，会有情况是条文写的不清不楚，难以区分订金或部分预付。例如一方面去把它称呼为部分预付，但另有条文说明对方不履行合约时可以没收。这里就涉及到根据合约条文的解释原则，希望找出一个答案。只说，英国法律在难以作出区分的时候通常是会倾向解释为部分预付的条文：Dies v British and International Mining and Finance Co(1939)1 KB 715。
订金与部分预付条文的分别可以去举船舶买卖作为例子。在二手船买卖中，世界上主要使用的标准格式就是1993年挪威格式（NSF‘93）。它的第2条文就是要求买方在合约订立的规定时间内去支付船价10%到一个共同账户，以作为买方买船的担保。另在第13条文，说明如果买方没有按时支付船价，卖方有权取消合约并没收订金，说：“Should the Purchase Price not be paid in accordance with Clause 3, the Sellers have the right to cancel the Agreement, in which case the deposit together with interest earned shall be released to the Sellers.”
但如果涉及新船买卖，也就是造船，在做法上就不是订金而是部分预付条文了。这在一些著名的标准格式，例如日本造船格式SAJ与BIMCO的Newbuildcon格式都这样规定。在SAJ，Article II是针对了船价的分期付款以及部分预付，在时间上是配合造船的进度。而针对船厂交不了船（不论是否涉及违约），就涉及了船厂作为卖方需要去退还部分预付给买方。造船合约也通常有其他条文去针对买方会退还部分预付的船价，包括要求船厂在造船合约生效前提供“还款担保”（refund guarantee）。在造船合约下退还部分预付，非但是不存在没收部分或者全部的金额，还往往要加上沉重的利息。
2.9.1 订金会有危险被视为是惩罚性损失赔偿
订金涉及惩罚性损失赔偿的危险是与议定赔偿一致的，就是它只能作为一个双方在谈判时候对一方不履行可能会造成的损失一个真实与预先的估计，如果脱离了而且金额定的过高（也就是指高额订金），就会有惩罚性损失赔偿的危险。但凡事都有例外，这里就涉及了订金这一课题的悠久历史。在罗马时代就已经有这种习惯做法，就是合约的一方去交出一笔钱或一样实物（例如一只戒指）表示履行合约的诚意。如果他在后来没有履行，订金或这一实物就会被没收。这些历史在Howe v.Smith(1884)27 Ch D 89先例有提到。在这种情况，订金不一定是与双方估计将来毁约会产生的损失有关系。在涉及了土地的买卖，一直以来的惯例是以约10%的合约价格作为订金，而英国的衡平法院也是从不干预，把这种做法视为一种例外。
涉及订金与惩罚性条文可以去介绍四个先例，如下：
2.9.2 有关先例之一: Stockloser v.Johnson
在Stockloser v.Johnson(1954)1 QB 476先例，Denning勋爵在该案的上诉庭说：
“Again, suppose that a vendor of property, in lieu of the usual 10 per cent, deposit, stipulates for an initial payment of 50 per cent of the prices as a deposit and part payment;and later, when the purchaser fails to complete, the vendor resells the property at a profit and in addition claims to forfeit the 50 per cent deposit.Surely the court will relieve against the forfeiture.The vendor cannot forestall this equity by describing an extravagant sum as a deposit, any more than he can recover a penalty by calling it liquidated damages.”（Denning勋爵是说假设在土地买卖，双方约定不是10%的订金而是高达50%，之后买方没有及时去完成交易，卖方把有关的土地转售并赚了钱。但卖方仍是去把这50%的订金没收，大赚特赚。这一来，法院是不会认同，会把这种情况视为是等同议定赔偿实是惩罚性损失赔偿而无效，去作出救济不允许卖方没收订金）。
2.9.3有关先例之二: Linggi Plantations Ltd v.Jagatheesan
在Linggi Plantations Ltd v.Jagatheesan(1972)1 MLJ 89先例，判是卖方可以去没收普遍的做法的10%订金，虽然卖方没有蒙受真正损失。Hailsham勋爵是这样说：
“It is also no doubt poible that in a particular contract the parties may use language normally appropriate to deposits properly so-called even to forfeit which turn out on investigation to be purely colourable and that in such a case the real nature of the transaction might turn out to be the imposition of a penalty, by purporting to render forfeit something which is in truth part payment.This no doubt explains why in some cases the irrecoverable nature of a deposit is qualified by the insertion of the adjective ‗reasonable‘ before the noun.But the truth is that a reasonable deposit has always been regarded as a guarantee of performance as well as a payment on account, and its forfeiture has never been regarded as a penalty in English law or common English usage.”
2.9.4有关先例之三：Workers Trust and Merchant Bank Ltd v Dojap Investments Ltd
在Workers Trust and Merchant Bank Ltd v Dojap Investments Ltd(1993)AC 573先例，案情涉及了Jamaica的土地买卖的一笔占合约价格25%的订金。买方比完成交易一天晚了一个星期才支付其余的合约价格，这是明显的违约，特别合约中有说明“时间是条件条文”（time is of the eence of the contract）。贵族院不接受这是一个没有惩罚性味道的订金，虽然卖方证明了Jamaica的土地买卖经常会发生买方要提供15%-50%的订金，这与英国的习惯做法不一样。但贵族院不认为有部分买卖把这个百分比的订金视为合理不影响它的判断这一个订金是否是惩罚性损失赔偿。Browne Wilkinson勋爵是这样说：
“Since a true deposit may take effect as penalty, albeit one permitted by law, it is hard to draw a line between a reasonable, permiible amount of penalty and an unreasonable, impermiible penalty.In their Lordships‘ view the correct approach is to start from the position that, without logic but by long continued usage both in the United Kingdom and formerly in Jamaica, the customary deposit has been 10 percent.A vendor who seeks to obtain a larger amount by way of forfeiture deposit must show special circumstances which justify such a deposit.…In the view of their Lordships, since the 25 percent deposit was not a true deposit by way of earnest, the provision for its forfeiture was a plain penalty.There is clear authority that in a case of a sum paid by one party to another under the contract as security for the performance of that contract, a provision for its forfeiture in the event of non-performance is a penalty from which the court will give relief by ordering repayment of the sum so paid, le any damage actually proved to have been suffered as a result of non completion: Commiion of Public Works v Hills(1906)AC 368.Accordingly, there is jurisdiction in the court to order repayment of the 25 percent deposit…
Finally, it appears that the bank may have suffered some damage as a result of the purchaser‘s failure to complete.If so, the bank is entitled to deduct the amount of such damages from the ‗deposit‘ of 25 percent.Such damage has not been quantified in the judgment below but appears to be small in amount.It would not be right to keep the purchaser out of all its money to await the outcome of the neceary inquiry as to damages.The bank ought accordingly to make immediate repayment of a substantial amount of the deposit, leaving a fund out of which the bank‘s damages, if any, can be satisfied”。
2.9.5有关先例之四：Union Eagle Ltd v Golden Achievement Ltd
在Union Eagle Ltd v Golden Achievement Ltd(1997)AC 514 PC先例，是香港在1997年回归祖国之前上诉去英国枢密院（也就是贵族院同一批大法官）的房子买卖先例。案情涉及了买方比约定完成交易的最后时间晚了10分钟，结果合约被卖方终断并没收10%的订金。因为有关合约写明“时间是条件条文”（time is of the eence of the contract），所以晚了10分钟也是违反了条件条文。买方向香港法院申请“履约指令”（specific performance），但在高院与上诉庭都不成功。在贵族院，买方也是败诉，其中Hoffman勋爵是这样说：
“… When a vendor exercises his right to rescind, he terminates the contract.The purchaser‘s lo of the right to specific performance may be said to amount to a forfeiture of the equitable interest which the contract gave him in the land.But this forfeiture is different in its nature from, for example, the vendor‘s right to retain a deposit or part payments of the purchase price.So far as these retentions exceed a genuine pre-estimate of damage or a reasonable deposit they will constitute a penalty which can be said to be eentially to provide security for payment of the full price.No objectionable uncertainty is created by the existence of a restitutonary form of relief against forfeiture, which gives the court a discretion to order repayment of all or part of the retained money.But the right to rescind the contract, though it involves termination of the purchaser‘s equitable interest, stands upon a rather different footing.Its purpose is, upon breach of an eential term, to restore to the vendor his freedom to deal with his land as he pleases.In a rising market, such a right may be valuable but volatile.Their Lordships think that in such circumstances a vendor should be able to know with reasonable certainty whether he may resell the land or not.It is for this reason that, for the past 80 years, the courts in England although ready to grant restitutionary relief against penalties, have been unwilling to grant relief by way of specific performance against breach of an eential condition as to time.In Steedman v Drinkle(1916)1 AC 275, 279 Viscount Haldane said:
‘Courts of Equity, which look at the substance as distinguished from the letter of agreements, no doubt exercise an extensive jurisdiction which enables them to decree specific performance in cases where justice requires it, even though literal terms of stipulations as to time have not been observed.But they never exercise this jurisdiction where the parties have exprely intimated in their agreement that it is not to apply by providing that time is to be of the eence of their bargain’.”。
表面看来，如果房价在上涨，卖方借这个机会去终断买卖合约并去以更高的价格转售，但同时又可以把可怜买方的10%订金没收，好像很不合理。至少，应该把这10%订金退还给买方。但仔细去分析应该是不能这样做，首先卖方向法院申请的是去作出履约指令。但如果法院去作出履约指令，就等于去改变了双方约定的合约条文，也就是去强制延长完成交易的期限10分钟。而且，也会带来法律的不肯定，因为卖方有可能一去终断后随即把该层房子转售。但如果事后法院去作出履约指令，卖方就会夹在当中。所以，法院是不会去作出这种履约指令的。但如果买方向法院同时申请衡平法下的“禁止没收”（relief against forfeiture），也就是要卖方退还这10%，也是成问题。在本章2.9.3段所介绍的Linggi Plantations Ltd v.Jagatheesan(1972)1 MLJ 89先例就显示了这一个做法不可行。只会在订金约定是太高，例如是20%或30%，法院才会去作出这一种的救济。
2.10英国法院近期对惩罚性条文的放宽
较早时候已经说过，英国法院对美国法院针对惩罚性损失赔偿的做法不以为然，但在近期的一些先例看来，英国法院也在这方面去放宽。这里的原因是惩罚性条文被视为干预商业合约的订约自由，所以有一个说法是只要该条文有一个“商业合理性”（commercial justification），英国法院就不愿再去否定有关的条文。
首先，不去干预订约自由的说法，是Philips Hong Kong v.Attorney General of Hong Kong(1993)61 BLR 41, PC先例中，Woolf勋爵认同加拿大最高院的Elsey v.J G Collins Insurance Agencies Ltd(1978)83 DLR 1与澳大利亚高院的Esanda Finance Corporation Ltd v Plenig(1989)ALJ 238，说： “It is now evident that the power to strike down a penalty clause is a blatant interference with freedom of contract and is designed for the sole purpose of providing relief against oppreion for the party having to pay the stipulated sum.It has no place where there is no oppreion.”
在接下去的Lordsvale Finance Plc v.Bank of Zambia(1996)QB 752先例，Colman大法官就提到了条文如果有“商业合理性”（commercial justification）的解释，就不应该去干预，说：
“The speeches in Dunlop…show that whether a provision is to be treated as a penalty is a matter of construction to be resolved by asking whether at the time the contract was entered into the predominant contractual function of the provision was to deter a party from breaking the contract or to compensate the innocent party for breach…The question that has always had to be addreed is therefore whether the alleged penalty clause can pa muster as a genuine pre-estimate of lo…However the jurisdiction in relation to penalty clauses is concerned not primary with the enforcement of inoffensive liquidated damages clauses but rather with protection against the effect of penalty clauses.There would therefore seem to be no reason in principle why a contractual provision the effect of which was to increase the consideration payable under an executory contract upon the happening of a default should be struck down as a penalty if the increase could in the circumstances be explained as commercially justifiable, provided always that its dominant purpose was not to deter the other party from breach.”
在接下去的Alfred McAlpine Capital Projects Ltd v Tilebox Ltd(2005)BLR 271先例中，Jackson大法官有类似的说法针对双方有同等谈判力量时订立的商业合约，说：
“Because the rule about penalties is an anomaly within the law of contract, the courts are predisposed, where poible, to uphold contractual terms which fix the level of damages for breach.This predisposition is even stronger in the case of commercial contracts freely entered into between parties of comparable bargaining power.”
最后要介绍的就是M & J Polymers Ltd v.Imerys Minerals Ltd(2008)1 Lloyd‘s Rep 541先例，它涉及了一条有争议是否属于惩罚性条文的“Take or Pay”（这种条文在商业合约经常会有，就是要求买方必须在一个期间内购买一定数量的货物，如果数量不足仍然必须支付一个最低限额的货价），英国法院就非常重视双方在谈判时是如何达成这方面的协议的。其中Burton大法官这样解释：
“On the facts of this case, I am entirely satisfied that the take or pay clause was commercially justifiable, did not amount to oppreion, was negotiated and freely entered into between parties of comparable bargaining power, and did not have the predominant purpose of deterring a breach of contract nor amount to provision in terrorem.The evidence was wholly clear.The negotiations took place between extremely well qualified, able and savvy commercial men against a very significant commercial background, including a background of previous dealings.At the time when they were negotiating there was, on the one hand, an extreme scarcity of acrylic acid（买卖的货物）, a willingne on the part of the claimant to commit supply to the defendant, notwithstanding the requirements of their other customers, but in return expecting an absolute commitment to take a minimum quantity of the product to be manufactured with that acid, and, on the other hand, a clear recognition of the difficult commercial position in which the defendant found itself, a desperate need to secure supplies of the product and a desire to keep the contract as short as poible;with the result that there was give and take on both sides, a shorter term than the defendant desired, but so far as the defendant was concerned, the significant advantage, as it then saw it, of a get out clause via the meet or release provision in article 5.6…
There is more of the same.I am entirely satisfied that the take or pay provision does not offend against the rule against penalties and that the claimant is entitled to recover the price of the shortfall pursuant to article 5.5.This enables me to be satisfied that I can uphold and enforce a clause which might be described in similar terms to those used by Millett LJ in Jervis v.Harris(1996)Ch 195 at page 207.‗where the Court(was)asked for the first time to strike down(as a penalty)a standard claim which has been familiar to…lawyers for generation‘.”
2.11 近期部分有关惩罚性条文先例的介绍
2.11.1 先例之一：General Trading Company v Richmond Corp Ltd
在General Trading Company v Richmond Corp Ltd(2008)2 Lloyd‘s Rep 475先例，涉及了原告向被告购买一家英国的名店，名为“GTC Mayfair”。在双方谈判的时候，该名店正在严重的亏损，高达每月10万英镑。原告作为买方计划与相信可以去把该名店的状况扭转，但估计会欠缺流动现金去进货，特别是为圣诞节去准备充足的存货。这一来，就要求在合约中被告的卖方通过向银行保证去在两年内提供给买方20万英镑的资金。而如果被告没有这样做，原告就可以取消作为购买名店的54万英镑的“票据抵押贷款”（Loan Notes）。有关的条文可部分节录一下：
“17.11 The Seller shall procure the provision of the Loan Guarantees within 30 days of receiving notice in writing from the Company to such effect which the Company may give to the Seller(in accordance with the notice provisions in Clause 15)at any time from 60 days after the Completion Date.17.15 If the Seller fails to procure the provision the Loan Guarantees as required under clauses 17.10 and 17.11(time being of the eence), the Loan Notes shall be cancelled with immediate effect and the Buyer shall be under no obligation to make any payments of any kind under the Loan Notes”。
从表面看来，违约（没有提供20万英镑的资金）与后果（取消54万英镑的票据抵押贷款）并不相称，有很重的惩罚性味道。但Beatson大法官最后接受有关条文并非是惩罚性认为不能光是去看议定赔偿的金额相比真正的损失是否相称，而是要去全面考虑。在该先例，就考虑到双方都是有水平的商业人士，原告得不到这20万英镑的流动资金就会有风险要把该名店关门，令他的投资化为乌有，等方面。Beatson大法官是这样说：“At the outset of the hearing I inclined to the view that this clause inserted, at the very end o the negotiations, was penal because of the size of the difference between the amount of the loan to be guaranteed and the amount of the loan notes that would be cancelled.In the light of the evidence, however, and the broader approach of Buxton and Clarke LJJ in Murray v Leisureplay plc(2005)EWCA Civ 963, I am satisfied that it is not.In the circumstances of the contract, judged on 4 May when it was made, the clause was commercially justifiable, did not amount to oppreion, and was negotiated and freely entered into parties who were of comparable bargaining power.Most significantly, on the evidence the clause did not have the predominant purpose of deterring a breach of contract and did not thus amount to what in the older cases is referred to as a provision in terrorem.The evidence shows the following.First, as to the bargaining power of each side, although Richmond at that time was in a poor financial position, it was supported by offshore companies and trusts controlled by the Weston family and the financial, commercial and profeional resources available to them, including two experienced busine consultants, Meers Rodriguez and Barnett.Meers Gould and Middlemi also had significant commercial experience in the retail busine …”
2.11.2先例之二：The “Paragon”
在The ―Paragon‖(2009)2 Lloyd‘s Rep 688先例，涉及了有关的3-5个月+/-15天的租期的期租合约中有一条第101条文去针对延误还船需要调整租约租金，内容说：“The Charterers hereby undertake the obligation/responsibility to make thorough investigations and every arrangement in order to ensure that the last voyage of this Charter will in no way exceed the maximum period under this Charter Party.If, however, Charterers fail to comply with this obligation and the last voyage will exceed the maximum period, should the market rise above the Charter Party rate in the meantime, it is hereby agreed that the charter hire will be adjusted to reflect the prevailing market level from the 30th day prior to the maximum period date until actual redelivery of the veel to the Owners”。
该条文是要求承租人承诺最后航次不去超出最长的租期，也就是5个月加上15天的最后一天，在2007年5月14日。如果承租人没有去准时还船，而当时市场租金是超出了租约的租金（事后的情况也正是如此），双方同意去调整租约租金，就是在最后还船一天之前的30天，每天的租约的租金要去作出调整从29,500美元一天提高至当时市场租金，也就是46,083美元一天。后来，承租人的确是晚了还船，共达6.166天。承租人要去支付这6.166天的市场租金差价是没有异议，金额是89,560.87美元，承租人也的确是去支付了。但双方的争议是之前30天租约租金的调整，如果双方约定的是有效，就会是要求承租人多去支付30天乘（46,083美元减29,500美元）再扣取佣金相等等于约471,603.32美元的一笔额外“赔偿”。光从这笔庞大金额要去作出赔付，特别是承租人已经赔付了89,560.87美元，看来是有很重的味道是去惩罚与阻吓承租人不得去行走会延误还船日子的最后航次。但问题是第101条文写的很技巧，它没有去针对违约要支付的额外金额，而只是去针对调整原来租约要支付的租金。船东的争辩是说该船舶通常的航次长度是60天，所以最后航次如果是非法，也就是估计会超出最后还船的一天，就有必要去调整，而调整只是30天，这显示了双方在约定的时候曾经去小心估计真正会蒙受的损失。但仲裁庭，高院与上诉庭都不接受船东的说法。认为承租人如果作出非法最后航次的命令，船东所能去抗拒的就是要求承租人命令一个合法的最后航次。船东是不能假设承租人会去坚持，这构成了“毁约”（repudiation）可去让船东接受并终断租约。这种假设是不现实的，也不会事前知道承租人是否会坚持非法的最后航次，而不去撤回另去指定一个合法的最后航次。而在合法的最后航次在履行的时候，即使遇上延误而错过了最后还船日期，违约的损失计算也只能局限在延误的实际日子的市场租金差价。所以这101条文第2句的“调整”（adjust）租金并非是订约时估计违约会带来的真正损失，而是一条惩罚性损失赔偿条文。
2.11.3 先例之三：Tandrin Aviation Holdings Ltd v Aero Toy Store
在Tandrin Aviation Holdings Ltd v Aero Toy Store(2010)2 Lloyd‘s Rep 668先例，涉及了飞机买卖合约，价格是3.175千万美元。而在订合约的时候，买方就需要去支付300万美元的订金，并交给第三人（在本案例是列为第二被告）作为托管人。但之后的2009年1月（注意这是在2008年金融海啸后不久），卖方交付飞机但买方拒绝接收，也不去支付飞机价款。这导致了卖方要去向英国法院申请下令第二被告把这笔订金交出给卖方作为议定赔偿。而买方的一个抗辩是指有关去把订金充公的条文是属于惩罚性条文，该条文如下：“In the event Purchaser fails to accept delivery of the Aircraft and pay the Purchase Price to Seller in violation of the terms and conditions of this Agreement, and provided Seller is not then in breach or default in timely performing its written obligations hereunder, Seller shall have the right, after ten(10)Busine Days‘ prior written notice from Seller of such breach or default and Purchaser‘s failure to cure(or commence curing)the same with such 10-day period, to terminate this Agreement by written notice to Purchaser and the Escrow Agent.If Seller elects to terminate this Agreement pursuant to this Section 7.4.2, the Escrow Agent shall pay the Deposit to Seller as liquidated damages(and Seller and Purchaser shall promptly give written instructions to the Escrow Agent to that effect), and this Agreement shall be of no further force or effect.Seller acknowledges and represents that the liquidated damages amount provided for in this Section 7.4.2 is a reasonable estimate of the damages that would be incurred by Seller in the event Purchaser defaults on Purchaser‘s obligations under this Agreement.Seller‘s right to receive the Deposit as liquidated damages, shall be cumulative and not alternative, and shall be the sole remedy available to Seller in the event Purchaser defaults on Purchaser‘s obligations under this Agreement(other than a default under this Article 7.4.2);and Seller waives any other remedies that may be available to Seller, at law or in equity, as a consequence thereof”。
Hamblen大法官判该条文不是惩罚性损失赔偿条文，说：“The sum stipulated was not extravagant or unconscionable in amount in caparison with the greatest lo which could have followed from the breach.ATS‘s breach did not consist only in not paying a sum of money, but instead comprised the failure to accept delivery of the aircraft and pay for it.The deposit could be treated as liquidated damages only in the event of ATS‘s breach in failing to accept delivery of the aircraft and pay the balance of the purchase price, so this was not a case where the liquidated damages were payable by way of compensation on the occurrence of several events, some of which might occasion only trifling damage.The consequences of the breach were such as to make precise pre-estimation of damage almost an impoibility.In the circumstances, the pre-estimated damage was, and should be taken to be, the true bargain between the parties”。非复原损失赔偿之二：“返还性损失”（restitutionary damages）
这种“损失”（damage）是指受害方的原告受到侵权方或违约方的被告的错误行为，但没有因此而受到任何实际的损失，但被告却因此而得到了利益。这一来，为了不希望让被告取得这种“不当得利”（unjust enrichment），判他们必须赔付一笔返还性损失。但这是与英国法律针对民事诉讼的赔偿是根据“复原”大原则（restitutio in integrum 或compensatory principle）是有冲突之处，正如Megarry V.C.大法官在Tito v Waddell(No.2)(1977)Ch.106所说的：“It is fundamental to all questions of damages that they are to compensate the plaintiff for his lo or injury … The question is not one of making the defendant disgorge what he has saved by committing the wrong, but one of compensating the plaintiff”。这笔损失也与其他已经在许多侵权案件（特别是涉及财产的侵权）存在的救济办法例如是“返还”（restitution）、“返还性救济”（restitutionary remedy）、“交出利润”（account for profits）或被告因为侵权或违约而节省了的费用去交出给原告有雷同或重叠之处。“返还性损失”（restitutionary damages）只是在Attorney General v Blake(2001)1 AC 268先例之后才有的名堂。
反正是这种救济都是主要去看被告得到的利益（如果有的话）是什么，要求去把这些利益吐出来，而不是去追究原告自己有什么真正的损失。也是这一个原因，有不少人认为返还型损失的名堂有一点别扭，因为“返还”与“损失”是两码事，前者是“返还”（restitution）后者是“赔偿”（compensation），前者是属于衡平法，后者是属于普通法。
3.1作出“返还性损失”的理由
这可先去节录Diplock大法官在McCarey v Aociated Newspapers Ltd(No.2)(1965)2 QB 86所说：“The law is mocked if it enables a man to make a profit from his own wrong-doing.This is not punishment;it is merely preventing the defendant from obtaining a reward for his wrong-doing.But equally it is not compensation;the plaintiff is the accidental beneficiary of a rule of law based on public policy rather than on the reparation of private wrongs”。
另在My Kinda Town v Soll(1983)RPC 15中有说：“The purpose of awarding an account of profits … is not to prevent an unjust enrichment of the defendant …”
接下去是节录Nicholls勋爵在Attorney General v Blake(2001)1 AC 268先例中所说：“Even when awarding damages, the law does not adhere slavishly to the concept of compensation for financially measurable lo.When the circumstances require, damages are measured by reference to the benefit obtained by the wrongdoer … Further, in certain circumstances an account of profits is ordered in preference to an award of damages”。
适用返还性损失或交出利润的赔偿的情况很多，这主要是在侵权，包括了有关“财产侵权”（proprietary torts），“土地侵入”（trespa to land），“侵占或非法干预货物”（conversion, wrongful interference or trespa to goods），“知识产权的侵犯”（infringement of intellectual property rights），“信托关系”（fiduciary duty），等等。
3.2早期有关返还性救济的部分侵权案例或说法
这方面可去看一些先例的说法。首先可去节录Shaw勋爵在Watson Laidlaw & Co Ltd v Pott, Caels and Williamson(1914)31 RPC 104 HL中所举的例子，是有关一只马匹在主人没有允许的情况下被一个陌生人的被告私自短暂骑走。这种财产侵权没有对主人造成任何真正损失，因为在这期间该只马匹只在马槽内等待，被告还可以说是短暂骑走让马匹做运动，对该马匹是好事。Shaw勋爵是这样说：“If A, being a liveryman, keeps his hose standing idle in the stable, and B, against his wish or without his knowledge, rides or drives it out, it is no answer to A for B to say: ‗Against what lo do you want to be restored? I restore the horse.There is no lo.The horse is none the worse;it is better for the exercise”。
在Strand Electric Co v Brisford Entertainments(1952)2 QB 246 CA先例涉及了受害方原告的电子仪器在没有授权下被第三人的被告私下使用，上诉庭是判被告要赔偿给原告这一段时间的市场租金。虽然在现实中，原告是不会去出租这些电子仪器，所以所谓的损失赔偿是有一点矫揉造作的。在该先例，Denning大法官所明白是更接近返还性救济多过一个侵权的赔偿，说：“It is an action against him because he has had the benefit of the goods.It resembles therefore an action for restitution rather than an action of tort”。
这种案件在土地侵入的先例就更多了：Martin v Porter(1839)5 M.& W.351;Whitwham v Westminster Brymbo Coal Co(1896)2 Ch.538 CA;Penarth Dock Engineering Co v Pounds(1963)1 Lloyd‘s Rep.359;Swordheath Properties v Tabet(1979)1 WLR 285 CA;Ministry of Defence v Ashman(1993)25 HLR 513 CA;Ministry of Defence v Thompson(1993)24 HLR 552 CA;Inverugie Investments v Hackett(1995)1 WLR 713 PC;Severn Trent Water Ltd v Barnes(2004)2 EGLR 95 CA;Sinclair v Gavaghan(2007)EWHC 2256 Ch;Field Common Ltd v Elmbridge Borough Council(2008)EWHC 2079 Ch.。
举例说，在Penarth Dock Company v Pounds(1963)1 Lloyd‘s Rep 359先例涉及了一个二手“浮动干坞”（floating dock）的买卖，合约是要求买方尽快把该浮动干坞移走，但没有规定时间。买方却迟迟没有把浮动干坞从卖方已经废置了的船厂去移走，虽然卖方多次督促。这带来诉讼，卖方指买方违约与“侵占”（trespa）了他的地方长达大半年，而买方的抗辩是合约没有时间的规定要去把浮动干坞移走。加上，即使是违约，卖方并没有任何损失。在上诉庭，判是买方违约，即使没有时间上的规定，默示地位也是要求买方在合理时间内必须移走，而这一个合理时间已经过去。而针对卖方的损失，的确是卖方无法去证明。但被告侵占了卖方的地方，是被告如果不这样做而移走去其他地方是需要交付租金。这是被告省下的费用，可以作为去赔付原告的救济。Denning勋爵是这样说：“The question which remains is, what are the damages? True it is that the Penarth company themselves would not seem to have suffered any damage to speak of.They have not to pay any extra rent to the British Transport Commiion.The dock is no use to them;they would not have made any money out of it.But, neverthele, in a case of this kind, as I read the law, starting with Whitwham v Westminster Brymbo Coal and Coke Company,(1896)2 Ch.538, on which I commented myself in the case of Strand Electric and Engineering Company, Ltd v Brisford Entertainments Ltd(1952)2 QB 246, at pp.253 to 254, the test of the measure of damages is not what the plaintiffs have lost, but what benefit the defendant obtained by having the use of the berth;and the has been a trespaer, in my judgment, since Aug.9, 1962.What benefit has the defendant obtained by having the use of it for this time? If he had moved it elsewhere, he would have had to pay, on the evidence, £37 10s.a week for a berth for a dock of this kind.But the damages are not put as high as that, and the damages are to be aeed in accordance with the law as I have stated it at the rate of £37 5s.a week for a period commencing from Aug.9, 1962, which I would let run to Mar.25, 1963, because the dock has now been removed.I do not know what that sum will come to, but that can be a matter of calculation.I do not think that there is any call in the circumstances for a mandatory injunction or any other relief.另在Ministry of Defence v Ashman 与 Ministry of Defence v Thompson两个先例，涉及了军部要把廉价的居所从有家眷的军人收回，因为离婚导致了条件不再符合，但军人妻子拒绝或延误迁出。在前一个先例，军部索赔廉价（95英镑月租）与市场租金（500英镑月租）的差价，上诉庭最后判只是与当地公务员居所的租金（145英镑月租），因为这是军部要把居所收回后所作的用途，而且该军人妻子根本也不会考虑去市场租房子。
在这些先例中，一直有争议到底这种赔偿是否是属于返还性或是赔偿性。在Ministry of Defence v Ashman先例，Hoffman大法官认为是返还性，说：“it has not been exprely stated that a claim for mesne profits for trespa can be a claim for restitution.Nowadays I do not see why we should not call a spade a spade.In this case the Ministry of Defence elected for the restitutionary remedy”。
但在同一个上诉庭，Lloyd大法官认为这只是去作出损失赔偿，而返还性是法院无权去作出。而另一位Kennedy大法官是同意Hoffman大法官，但把它说成是“准合约返还”（quasi-contractual restitution）。
这些困难可去节录《McGregor on Damages》（第十八版，2009年）一书12-008段如下：“In the proprietary torts where restitutionary damages have flourished except in name, the courts have attempted to rationalize the damages awarded as compensatory on the basis of what is today generally referred to as the user principle, a phrase employed, and poibly initiated, by Nicholls LJ, as he then was, in Stoke City Council v W & J Wa Ltd(1988)1 WLR 1406 CA.The law has considered that a person should have a claim against one who has used his property without his consent, a claim to be measured by the amount which could reasonably be required to gain permiion for the property‘s use, and has regarded the claimant as suffering lo or damage by virtue of not have received that amount.However, Lord Nicholls in Attorney General v Blake recognises that, while the entitlement is established and uncontroversial, ‗more difficult is the alignment of this measure of damages within the basic compensatory measure.‘ And he added: ‗These awards cannot be regarded as conforming to the strictly compensatory measure of damage for the injured person‘s lo unle lo is given a strained and artificial meaning.The reality is that the injured person‘s rights were invaded but, in financial terms, he suffered no lo‘”。
3.3合约的返还性损失赔偿
衡平法的“返还”（restitution）在合约关系中去作出救济已经有了很长的历史。最为人所知的是如果没有合约规定报酬，或是合约终断，但一方当事人向对方提供服务并让对方得益，法院就会判对方要去支付一笔由法院厘定的“按照得益的合理报酬”（Quantum meruit fee）。这方面的先例有：Planche v Colburn(1831)8 Bing 14, 131 ER 305;British Steel Corporation v Cleveland Bridge & Engineering Co.Ltd(1984)1 All ER 504;Regalian Properties plc v London Dockland Development Corporation(1995)1 WLR 212。对租约熟悉的人士也会知道在船舶不合理绕航而导致程租合约被自动中断，租约内约定的运费不再适用。但如果船东把船上的货物安全运到目的地，他还是可以去要求货方支付一笔“Quantum meruit freight”。另一种衡平法会去作出救济的是在货物买卖或者是提供服务的合约关系下，一方当事人向对方作出了支付，但对方完全没有提供货物（或提供有缺陷的货物而被拒货）或服务。这一来，有说法是一个“完全得不到对价”（total failure of consideration），法院会要求对方马上作为债务去退还这一笔钱： Whincup v Hughes(1871)LR 6 CP 78。
但在本段所介绍的新发展的“返还性赔偿”（restitutionary damages）是针对不同的情况，就是在违约下要去作出的额外赔偿。这种赔偿在Attorney General v Blake(2001)1 AC 268先例后也开始出现在特殊情况下适用在合约关系下的违约，虽然是在合约赔偿损失的大原则，还是严格按照复原大原则去作出金钱的赔偿。这已经较早时在谈到“加大损失”（aggravated damages）与“惩罚性损失”（exemplary damages）有提到过是不适用在违约。例如在The ―Siboen‖ and the ―Sibotre‖（1976）1 Lloyd‘s Rep 293先例，涉及了船东的被告在一个三年的期租合约下错误撤船。由于船东撤船的时候不久，油轮市场暴升，导致了船东通过违约去赚了很多利润。这导致了承租人的原告去提出了交出利润的救济，也就是要求船东把撤船后赚的钱去交出。但这一个请求被Kerr大法官简短的去拒绝，说是这种救济是没有法律依据。这是显而易见的大道理，较早已节录了Megarry V.C.大法官在Tito v Waddell(No.2)(1977)Ch.106所说的话。
另在Surrey County Council v Bredero Homes Ltd(1993)1 WLR 1361先例，涉及了卖方（Surrey地区议会）出售一块土地给发展商。该买卖合约下是允许买方去根据批准的图则建造72栋房子，但成交后买方获得新的批准图则去加建了5栋房子。卖方向买方提出索赔，认为这一个好处应该是给卖方。但这被上诉庭拒绝，认为买方的加建虽然是违约，但没有造成对卖方有什么损失，所以只判给卖方一个2英镑名义上的损失赔偿，并为上诉庭所支持。其中上诉庭的Steyn大法官说是去延伸违约下的损失赔偿大原则会带来问题，其中去给予受害方一笔“利润”去作为他没有真正损失是否有必要？这会否对商业活动不利？加上，很多时候违约方会去为他的责任投保，所以这一笔利润其实是由保险人去掏出来，而保险人就会将来去提高保费，对大众都没有好处。Steyn大法官是这样说：“… The introduction of restitutionary remedies to deprive cynical contract breakers of the fruits of their breaches of contract will lead to greater uncertainty in the aement of damages in commercial and consumer disputes.It is of paramount importance that the why in which disputes are likely to be resolved the courts must be readily predictable.Given the premise that the aggrieved party has suffered no lo, is such a dramatic extension of restitutionary remedies justified in order to confer a windfall in each case on the aggrieved party? I think not.In any event such a widespread availability of restitutionary remedies will have a tendency to discourage economic activity in relevant situations.In a range of cases such liability would fall on underwriters who have insured relevant liability risks.Inevitably underwriters would have to be compensated for the new species of potential claims.Insurance premiums would have to go up.That, too, is a consequence which militates against the proposed extension.The recognition of the proposed extension will in my view not serve the public interest.It is sound policy to guard against extending the protection of the law of obligations too widely.For these substantive and policy reasons I regard it as undesirable that the range of restitutionary remedies should be extended in the way in which we have been invited to do so”。
但显然有人对Surrey County Council v Bredero Homes Ltd的判决感觉到不公平，也就是让买方可在违约的情况下仍然获得了所有的好处。或可以说卖方可以在买卖合约中订约细一点，例如说明如果加建房子要买方多支付多少钱。但问题是如果在订约时根本没有想到会有加建的问题，卖方是不会把所有无关有关的东西都写在买卖合约中，把它变为是一本厚厚的书。有不少人事后对这一个先例感到不满意，认为是不公平。可以说这一个问题已经稍后在Wrotham Park Estate Co v Parkside Homes(1974)1 WLR 798先例中有了解决办法，法院可去作出“交出部分利润”（account for profits）的判决，所以是这种赔偿也被称为“Wrotham Park赔偿”。
但合约关系以前也不是没有过要求违约方交出部分利润（或节省了的费用）作为赔偿的先例，只是案例很少与没有去重点或刻意针对这一点。这些先例有Reid-Newfoundland Co v Anglo-American Telegraph Co Ltd(1912)AC 555;British Motor Trade Aociation v Gillbert(1951)2 All ER 641;Strand Electric & Engineering Co Ltd v Brisford Entertainments Ltd(1952)2 QB 246；Lake v Bayli(1974)1 WLR 1073；等。
这种受害方证明不了金钱损失去返还的问题很多出现在土地、财产的侵权，这导致了违约方往往可以不必作出任何真正赔偿，也就大可以放心去违约了。所以，针对这种金钱赔偿不足够去作出救济的情况，英国法院往往是以另外一种救济的办法去替代金钱赔偿损失，这也就是去作出“履约指令”（specific performance）或“禁令”（injunction）,只要是受害方会尽早与及时向法院作出申请。这方面可去节录Nicholls勋爵在Attorney General v Blake先例中有提到土地买卖在这方面的问题说：“The claic example of this type of case, as every law student knows, is a contract for the sale of land.The buyer of a house may be attracted by features which have little or no impact on the value of the house.An award of damages, based on strictly financial criteria, would fail to recompense a disappointed buyer for this head of lo.The primary response of the law to this type of case is to ensure, if poible, that the contract is performed in accordance with its terms.The court may make orders compelling the party who has committed a breach of contract, or is threatening to do so, to carry out his contractual obligations.To this end the court has wide powers to grant injunctive relief.The court will, for instance, readily make orders for the specific performance of contracts for the sale of land, and sometimes it will do so in respect of contracts for the sale of goods.In Beswick v Beswick(1968)AC 58 the court made an order for the specific performance of a contract to make payments of money to a third party.The law recognized that the innocent party to the breach of contract had a legitimate interest in having the contract performed even though he himself would suffer no financial lo from its breach.Likewise, the court will compel the observance of negative obligations by granting injunctions.This may include a mandatory order to undo an existing breach, as where the court orders the defendant to pull down building works carried out in breach of covenant”。
3.3.1先例之一：Wrotham Park Estate Co v Parkside Homes
在合约关系下第一个近期重要先例作出返还性救济是在Wrotham Park Estate Co v Parkside Homes(1974)1 WLR 798，案情是涉及了一块土地的买卖。卖方在买卖合约中限制了发展商的买方（或他的受让人）在该块土地上建造的房子必须按照卖方批准的图则。但后来的受让人，也就是诉讼中的被告，建造了房子是违反了上述的限制。这导致了原告作为卖方保留了部分土地的承继人去向英国法院申请一个禁制令要求去把这些违约建造的房子全部清拆，但这被拒绝，原因是会造成不必要的浪费资源。这一来，剩下来的救济就只是金钱损失的赔偿。但被告的争议就是这些建造的房子并没有影响该块土地的价值，所以原告没有损失。英国法院认为这一个抗辩看来并不公道，Brightman大法官是这样说：“it was just that the plaintiffs should receive no compensation and that the defendants should be left in undisturbed poeion of the fruits of their wrongdoing“。结果是判被告要把他估计利润的5%作为赔偿，这赔偿是Brightman大法官认为如果原告被要求在买卖合约中放宽这一个限制，就会得到的一笔合理的金额（such a sum of money as might reasonably have been demanded … as a quid pro quo for relaxing the covenant）。相比较早前介绍的Surrey County Council v Bredero Homes Ltd(1993)1 WLR 1361先例，这一个先例看来是公平的多，所以在Attorney General v Blake(2001)1 AC 268先例中，贵族
