潜伏在阴影中——中国非银行中介带来的风险_09年中国银行笔试题目
潜伏在阴影中——中国非银行中介带来的风险由刀豆文库小编整理，希望给你工作、学习、生活带来方便，猜你可能喜欢“09年中国银行笔试题目”。
Lurking in the Shadows—The Risks from Nonbank Intermediation in China 潜伏在阴影中——中国非银行中介带来的风险
纽约时报：Posted on November 3, 2011 by iMFdirect
By
(Version in)
One of my all-time favorite movies is starring由··担任主角 Orson Welles and Joseph Cotten.It is a British film noir黑色电影；悲观电影 from the 1940s.Perhaps the most striking引人瞩目的 part of the movie is the shadowy朦胧的 cinematography电影艺术, set in post-World War II二战后 Vienna维也纳.Strangely, it springs to突然出现 mind lately when I have been thinking of China.Many China-watchers关注中国的人 looked on in awe敬畏 in 2009 as the government’s response to the global financial crisis unfolded展开的, causing bank lending as a share of the economy to expand by close to 20 percentage points in le than a year.This, subsequently随后, led to a lot of hand-wringing棘手问题 about the consequences of those actions and the eventual credit quality problems that China would have to confront应对 and manage.However, around the same time, a le visible明显的 phenomenon was also getting underway发生.One that, like Orson Welles’ character in the movie, resided居住于 firmly in the shadows.Various types of nonbank financial intermediaries—some new, some old—were gearing up准备好 to provide a conduit管道；渠道 through which China’s high savings would be tapped发掘 to finance the corporate sector企业部门.The available data on this is terrible—the central bank’s numbers on social financing are the only credible可靠的 and comprehensive public source, but even that gives only a partial picture.Talking to people in China, and looking at what numbers are available, one cannot help but have an uneasy feeling that more credit is now finding its way into the economy outside of在··范围之外 the banking system than is actually flowing through the banks.The means by which such “lending” is being provided is wide-ranging广泛的；各种各样的 and dynamically动态地 evolving进化的.Certainly many are aware of the high volumes大量使用 of bankers’ acceptances银行承兑汇票—off-balance sheet short-term credit表外短期信贷—being used of late最近；近来.Over the past couple of years, trusts信托 and entrusted lending委托贷款 vehicles(China’s own particular特有的 form of aet securitization)have also taken off动身；发展起来.Then there is the world of informal lending: loan sharks高利贷者 charging high interest rates to those poor souls that are rationed配额 out of regular channels of intermediation.The recent narrative故事；事件 from Wenzhou has certainly excited many.But the shadows stretch延伸 even beyond these tales.In the 12 months to June截止到今年6月的12个月内, over RMB 600 billion poured into涌入 China from short-term lending by nonresidents非居民 to Chinese corporations.Financial leasing融资租赁 companies have expanded, providing services that look a lot like credit by another name.The corporate bond market has bloomed, perhaps reaching RMB 1 trillion万亿 in new iuance发行 for this year.There is an unknown volume of inter-corporate lending paing from one large company to another.And finally, some nonbank institutions have entrepreneurially开拓进取地 moved into the lending space, providing loans to large corporations as a way to boost推进 their profitability盈利能力.These developments are worrying令人担忧的 for four broad reasons. First, that’s an awful lot of credit.New bank credit alone is likely to be over 20 percent of GDP this year.This is already a very high number.However, if a similar amount(or more)is finding its way into the economy through channels outside the regulated banking system, this would add up to合计达 a huge amount of credit stimulus刺激.This high level of credit, in turn转而；反反过来；轮流, is facilitating促进 a continued upward trajectory轨道 for investment which is fast approaching接近 50 percent of GDP. Second, the regulatory oversight监督 for these various intermediaries is likely to有可能 be nowhere near离··很远 as effective and comprehensive as it is for the banks.We have seen this in many other countries—deposits and lending migrate移动 out of the banking system because life is just easier there without those pesky麻烦的，讨厌的 regulators asking awkward尴尬的 questions about how risks are being managed.It often doesn’t end well. Third, if nonbank channels非银行渠道 of intermediation develop at a faster pace than the banking system is reformed, the shift转移 of resources out of the banks and into the shadows will progreively日益增多的 start to undermine the health and stability稳定性 of the banks themselves. Finally, and perhaps my largest concern.The rapidly expanding nonbank system is actively undermining逐渐损害 China’s ability to exercise实施 macroeconomic control宏观调控.This, in large part, reflects the structure of the current system.China uses monetary tools like interest rates and reserve requirements法定准备金 sparingly保守的 and, instead, relies heavily on quantitative定量的 limits on bank lending银行借贷 to switch on and off the credit taps and manage the pace of economic growth.These bank-by-bank各个银行间 credit quotas信贷规模 create enormous incentives激励 for intermediaries to find other ways to lend.By not actively using interest rates and price incentives激励 to choke抑制；窒息 of the demand for loans, China is far too reliant依赖的 on controlling the supply of credit.The more intermediation that takes place outside banks, the tougher it is to enforce the credit policy信贷政策 that is eential in guiding the trajectory轨道 of the economy.Thankfully幸好, China’s regulators调整者 are trying to pursue追求；致力于；探讨；解决 the problem.Last year they moved to require a large share of trusts信托 to be brought back onto bank balance sheets and, more recently, the bank regulator has iued instructions指令；说明 to the banks to stop moving loans off their books账簿 and repackaging重新包装 them into wealth management财富管理 products.Despite these efforts, this risks the regulatory authorities法规机构；监管当局 perpetually永久的 being one step behind the financial innovators创新者, always patching up修补 the last hole in the system.What is needed instead, as we have argued for some time now, is a careful reexamination再检查；再调查 of the whole monetary and financial framework框架.Policies that restrain 控制；约束credit through administrative means行政方法 are becoming increasingly difficult to sustain维持.It is only going to get worse.This has been the experience of every other country that has tried to exercise实施 macroeconomic control this way.China, admittedly无可否认地, has held the system together exceptionally异常地；意外地 well for many years and it is never wise to bet against the government’s ability to diagnose诊断；判断 and succefully resolve problems as the economy develops and becomes more sophisticated富有经验的.That does not alter改变 the fact, though, that China is now facing a clear choice: pursue financial and monetary reform on a timetable时间表 that is driven by careful, pre-emptive优先的, and concerted policy planning.Or, face the poibility that change will evolve发展；进化 in an uncoordinated不协调的 and disorderly混乱的 way, with innovation and disintermediation outpacing赶过；超过速度 supervisory capabilities监督管理能力 and revealing揭示；展现 regulatory调控的 gaps along the way.At the end of The Third Man, Orson Welles emerges出现 from the shadows and, unfortunately, promptly迅速地 meets an untimely不合时宜的 end at the hands of出于··之手 Joseph Cotten.It would be a major setback挫折；退步；逆流 for China, and the global economy, if the long and proven track record可靠的工作业绩 of spectacular惊人的 Chinese growth were to be undermined by waiting too long to make progre on financial liberalization金融自由化 and reform.潜伏在阴影中——中国非银行中介带来的风险
作者：Nigel Chalk
我一直最喜欢的一部影片是Orson Welles 和 Joseph Cotton 主演的《第三个人》。这是上世纪40年代的一部英国黑色电影。这部电影最令人震撼的部分也许是通过摄影表现出的第二次世界大战后维也纳的朦胧阴郁。奇怪的是，当我想到中国时，这种景象却会跳入我的脑海。
2009年，许多关注中国的人不无震惊地发现：随着中国政府为应付全球金融危机而采取的措施逐步铺开，银行贷款相对于经济规模的比例在不到一年的时间里上升了近20个百分点。由此，这些行动带来了很多棘手的问题，最终，中国还必须面对和处理信贷质量问题。
然而，在同一时期，一个不那么明显的情况也在悄悄发展，就像Orson Welles在电影中所扮演的那个深藏于阴影中的角色。各种或新或老的非银行中介形式逐渐活跃起来，构成一种渠道，中国的大量储蓄通过这一渠道被利用起来，为公司部门提供融资。这方面的现有数据很不理想——中央银行关于社会融资的数据是唯一可信和全面的公开数据来源，但即使这些数据也只能局部地说明问题。
在与中国人士交谈以及分析现有数据之后，我们只能产生这样一种不踏实的感觉，相比通过银行流动的信贷资金，越来越多的信贷正通过银行体系以外的渠道流入经济。
这种“贷款”的提供方式是各种各样且不断演进的。
当然，很多人都知道近来银行承兑汇票（表外短期信贷）的大量使用。在过去几年里，信托和委托贷款（中国特有的资产证券化形式）也逐渐发展起来。还有那些非正式的贷款：向无法利用正常中介渠道的借款人提供高利率贷款的高利贷者。最近的温州事件显然引起了很多关注。
但是，影子甚至还不限于此。
在截至今年6月的12个月里，超过6000亿元人民币的资金以非居民对中国企业短期贷款的形式涌入中国。金融租赁公司在扩张，它们提供的服务非常类似于信贷，只是名称不同罢了。企业债券市场很活跃，今年的新发行量也许达到了1万亿元人民币。不清楚大型企业之间的贷款量有多大。最后，一些非银行机构开始大胆地涉足贷款业务，向大型企业提供资金，以增强自身盈利能力。
这些情况令人担忧，原因主要有四个。
首先，信贷规模太大了。今年，仅银行新增贷款就可能超过GDP的20%。这已经是一个很大的数字。然而，如果类似数额（甚至更多）的资金通过受监管的银行体系之外的渠道流入经济，这会形成大规模信贷刺激。高水平的贷款进而会促使投资持续增加，中国的投资目前正快速接近GDP的50%。
其次，相比对银行的监管，对这些中介形式实施监管的有效性和全面性可能要差得多。许多其他国家都曾有过这样的情况——存款和贷款从银行体系流出，因为外面的日子更轻松，没有讨厌的监管人员提出关于风险管理的尴尬问题。而这最终往往没有好结果。 第三，如果非银行中介渠道的发展速度快于银行体系的改革速度，资金从银行向影子体系的转移会逐渐损害银行自身的健康和稳定。
最后，也是我最担心的问题。快速扩张的非银行体系正在严重削弱中国实施宏观经济调控的能力。这在很大程度上反映了当前体系的结构。中国只是偶尔使用利率和存款准备金率等货币政策工具，却高度依赖对银行贷款的数量限制来控制信贷和调节经济增长步伐。这些针对各家银行制定的信贷限额使中介机构有极大的动机去寻求其他贷款方式。中国没有积极运用利率和价格机制来控制贷款需求，因此过于依赖对信贷供给的控制。在银行体系之外进行的资金中介活动越多，执行信贷政策的难度就越大（信贷政策正是目前调控经济的基本手段）。
幸好，中国的监管者正在努力解决这个问题。去年，他们要求银行将很大一部分信托业务转回资产负债表内。最近，银行监管机构向银行发出指示，要求它们停止将贷款从账簿上转走并重新打包成理财产品。
尽管采取了这些措施，但监督当局可能永远比金融创新者慢一步，总是在修补金融体系中的上一个漏洞。
正如我们一段时间以来一直主张的，中国需要对整个货币和框架进行仔细检查。通过行政手段限制信贷的政策正变得越来越难以维持。情况只会变得更糟。当年曾试图以这种方式实施宏观经济调控的其他国家都有这种经历。应当承认，中国多年来出色地维持了这一体系；鉴于中国经济的不断发展和日趋成熟，中国政府在诊断并成功解决新问题方面的能力是毋庸置疑的。然而，这并不改变这样的事实，即，中国现在显然面临一个抉择：要么，以谨慎、主动、协调的方式做出政策规划，并在此基础上有步骤地实行金融和货币改革；要么，当创新和脱媒的速度超过监督能力的提高速度，监督缺陷在此过程中逐渐显现时，以不协调、无秩序的方式进行改革。
在影片《第三个人》结尾，Orson Welles 从阴影中走出来，可惜立刻被 Joseph Cotton 迅速干掉了。如果中国的金融放开和改革迟迟不能取得进展，那么长期以来中国非凡的经济增长将受到损害。对于中国和全球经济而言，这都将是一个重大挫折。
在几千年皇权历史的中华大地，有句口头禅异常流行：皇帝轮流做，明年到我家。上下三千年，几乎每个中国人心中都潜伏着一个帝王的梦想。什么样的梦想堆出什么样的土壤，什么样的土壤结......
专业 专注工作总结 述职报告 竞聘演讲稿尽在金融人网站中国金融体系中的三类风险及其防范 金融风险是指金融机构在经营过程中由于宏观经济政策环境的变化，市场的波动、汇率的......
中国正在制定的劳动合同法可能给企业带来的变化作者：姜俊禄中国全国人民代表大会（简称：中国人大）已经将《劳动合同法》的制定列入2005年的立法规划，中国劳动和社会保障部作为国务......
经济转型期中国如何在风险与挑战中突围当前各类社会矛盾凸显，社会运行存在严峻的系统性风险，经济社会面临发展方向、发展动力、发展方式和发展状态的多元复合转型，这就需要充分......
兆龙移民 www.zhaolong.net中国出入境移民中介服务机构排行榜中,排名前五的都是哪些有数据显示，2013年全球有2.32亿人口移民海外，作为全球排名第四的移民输出国，中国目前移民人......
